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NODAL GOVERNANCE OF THE U.S. 
ELECTRICITY GRID 
ALISON GOCKE* 
The U.S. electricity grid faces more challenges on a wider scale than 
ever before—climate change, energy poverty, crumbling grid 
infrastructure, the pending onboarding of millions of new grid devices, 
etc. Preparing the grid for these challenges is not an engineering 
problem, but rather a governance one: we need a new model for how to 
govern our grid. 
Grid experts often advocate for one of two centralized governance 
models: the command-and-control system associated with the early 
development of the electricity grid, or the neoliberal system associated 
with more recent market reforms. 
This article argues that both of these models are wrong. Neither 
model accurately describes how the grid has functioned in the past or 
how it ought to function today. Instead, a close examination of the grid 
and its history reveals a highly decentralized network in which private 
firms, industry associations, public utilities, local organizations, and 
state and federal regulators all influence grid governance. This landscape 
is more aptly labeled a “nodal governance system,” wherein power is 
wielded by a variety of state, sub-state, and non-state actors. 
The nodal governance model is not only descriptively accurate, but 
also useful. First, using a nodal governance framework, we can develop 
a true topography of all the players and “power” flows on the U.S. 
electricity grid. Second, a nodal governance system carries certain 
benefits we often associate with decentralized governing systems and 
may even provide a path forward for current policy issues, such as the 
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regionalization of California’s electricity grid or the Green New Deal. 
And third, the nodal governance model reveals the threat that a grid 
jurisprudence premised on centralized models—recently embraced by 
the Supreme Court—could pose to our grid. This article argues that we 
ought to preserve the grid’s nodal nature and leverage it to prepare the 
grid for the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
Electricity is a necessity in the modern world. But as the recent 
example of Puerto Rico shows us, the system that delivers that 
electricity—the electricity grid—is vulnerable to failure.  
As the U.S. moves into a future where electricity becomes even 
more central to our lives—powering our phones, computers, cars, 
homes, and essentially every private and public institution in the 
country—our electricity grid faces more threats than it ever has before. 
Climate change,1 energy poverty,2 cybersecurity attacks,3 crumbling 
 
 1.  In order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the levels agreed to by the international 
community in the Paris Climate Agreement, carbon dioxide equivalent emissions from the U.S. 
electricity grid must drop around 70% below today’s levels by 2050. RACHEL CLEETUS, ALISON 
BAILIE, & STEVE CLEMMER, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE U.S. POWER SECTOR IN 
A NET ZERO WORLD: ANALYZING PATHWAYS FOR DEEP CARBON REDUCTIONS 1 (2016). 
Practically, this means that by 2030, coal-fired power plants must be almost entirely phased-out; 
natural gas plants must comprise less than a third of electricity generation; and non-hydroelectric 
renewable energy must provide almost 50% of our electricity needs. Id. at 7 fig.4. 
 2.  In 2016, approximately 2.9 million people in eighteen states had their electricity cut off 
because they were unable to pay their bills. Jim Polson, More Americans Are Getting Their 
Electricity Cut Off, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-10-13/in-great-american-blackout-millions-go-dark-due-to-unpaid-bills. The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services reports that more than six million households receive 
financial aid on their home heating bills through the Low Income Home Energy Assistance 
program (LIHEA), a federal program designed to provide financing to low-income families 
struggling to pay their electricity bills. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LOW INCOME 
HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 vi 
(2014). And LIHEA funding has only been able to reach around 19% of eligible households. Id. 
 3.  According to a 2016 report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, there have 
been an increasing number of cybersecurity events on the U.S. electricity grid over the last few 
years, primarily in the form of malware attacks intended to hack into grid computer systems. ICF 
INT’L, ELECTRIC GRID SECURITY AND RESILIENCE: ESTABLISHING A BASELINE FOR 
ADVERSARIAL THREATS 17 (2016). The Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, has even 
warned that ongoing and ever-more-advanced cyberattacks to critical U.S. infrastructure, 
including the electricity grid, threaten a “Cyber 9/11.” Dan Coats, Director of National 
Intelligence, Remarks Delivered to the Billington Cybersecurity Summit (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-interviews/speeches-interviews-2017/item/ 
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grid infrastructure,4 and the massive grid modernization project 
required to support millions of new devices5 all present challenges to 
the grid on an unprecedented scale. If not properly addressed, these 
challenges could lead to dire consequences. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, these challenges are not ones of technology or engineering, 
but rather ones of governance. We have, for the most part, the 
mechanical systems we need to bring our electricity grid into the future. 




 4.  The American Society of Civil Engineers estimated that we will have a grid 
infrastructure investment gap of approximately $107 billion by the end of the decade if investment 
continues apace, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, FAILURE TO ACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 5 (2011). The electric 
industry projects than an additional $298 billion of new transmission system investment will be 
needed between 2010 and 2030 to maintain current levels of grid reliability. MARC W. CHUPKA 
ET AL., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S POWER INDUSTRY: THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE 2010-
2030, at 38 (2008). Climate change is expected to accelerate physical threats to the grid: many 
power generation facilities are at risk due to decreasing water availability in a warming climate; 
energy infrastructure located along the coastlines is threatened by sea level rise and more frequent 
and intense storms; oil and gas supply chains are likely to be disrupted during extreme weather 
events; transmission lines operate less efficiently at higher temperatures; and increasing 
temperatures can put greater stress on peak demand periods. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. 
ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER 7 (2013). 
 5.  In order to incorporate new “smart grid” technologies that allow for a more sustainable, 
efficient, automated, iterative, and self-healing grid, we will need to spend somewhere between 
$300–$500 billion. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., ESTIMATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
THE SMART GRID: A PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF THE INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS AND THE 
RESULTANT BENEFITS OF A FULLY FUNCTIONING SMART GRID 1–4 (2011). 
 6.  See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (“Energy federalism and governance are at the heart of this struggle [to 
manage modern grid challenges].”); Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Dynamic Energy 
Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 779 (2013) (calling for “a needed rethinking of energy 
governance”); Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 
69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 146 (2016) (“The governance challenges and implications [of the modern 
grid] alone are staggering, and, at this point, anything but clear.”); William Boyd, Public Utility 
and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1620 (2014) (recognizing the need for a 
“common, collective enterprise of building and elaborating the institutions, regulatory structures, 
and business models that will be necessary to realize a low-carbon future”); Joel B. Eisen, An 
Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA 
L. REV. 1712, 1714 (2014) (“Hardly a day goes by without some call for transformative regulatory 
change to the U.S. electric grid to promote the development and deployment of revolutionary 
technologies.”). 
 7.  See, e.g., Severin Borenstein, Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-In Residential 
Dynamic Electricity Pricing, 42 REV. INDUS. ORG. 127 (2013) (advocating for adoption of new 
governance mechanisms that incorporate time-varying retail pricing for electricity in order to 
improve the efficiency of electricity markets). 
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engineers,8 and industry associations,9 is a grid governance model that 
can make these changes happen. 
The current proposals on the table often revolve around two 
stylized versions of grid governance and grid history. The first form of 
governance, associated with the formation and spread of the electricity 
grid beginning in the early twentieth century and extending through 
the 1980s, is known as the public utility or regulatory compact model.10 
In this version, the electricity grid is understood as a severely 
hierarchical, heavily regulated industry. Electricity is generated, 
transmitted, and delivered to end-use customers on a grid governed by 
the same monopoly owner and functioning in a single, top-down 
direction. 
The second form of electricity governance is a neoliberal version 
of the grid. This model emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, when 
regulators embraced a market-based approach to electricity 
management.11 During this time, the federal government broke electric 
utilities’ monopoly grip on the wholesale side of electricity sales, forced 
utilities across the country to allow non-utility generators access to 
utilities’ transmission lines, and established regulated wholesale 
markets to allow parties to buy and sell electricity at competitive prices. 
Most academics and policy makers have bought into these two 
binary versions of grid history, debating whether modern grid 
problems should be addressed through a more robust or revised 
 
 8.  See, e.g., IGNACIO PÉREZ-ARRIAGA ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH., UTILITY OF THE 
FUTURE: AN MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE RESPONSE TO AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION ix (2016) 
(“[T]he need for proactive reform is clear. Customers now face unprecedented choice regarding 
how they get their power and how they manage their electricity consumption—regardless of 
whether they are aware of those choices or are acting on them today.”); J.D. TAFT & A. BECKER-
DIPPMAN, PAC. NW. NAT’L LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GRID ARCHITECTURE 4.6 (2015) 
(“Due to the relationships between regulatory structure and emerging needs for new types of 
coordination, the nature of the interplay between regulatory structure and reliability 
responsibility and management are coming under scrutiny in the industry.”). 
 9.  See, e.g., PETER KIND, EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 3 
(2013) (“While we cannot lay out an exact roadmap or timeline for the impact of potential 
disruptive forces, given the current shift in competitive dynamics, the utility industry and its 
stakeholders must be prepared to address these challenges in a way that will benefit customers, 
long-term economic growth, and investors.”). 
 10.  See infra Part I.A. 
 11.  See infra Part I.B. 
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version of the regulatory compact,12 or whether better market design 
and expanded competition is the answer.13 Also, within the legal 
literature, the discussion translates into a federalism issue: should we 
look to the federal government (often associated with the neoliberal 
market model) to provide clear governance over the grid,14 or should 
we promote experimentation at the state level (often associated with 
the regulatory compact model)?15 Some have even adopted a 
cooperative federalism approach that attempts to reconcile these 
narratives.16 
 
 12.  See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 6, at 1675–1703 (arguing for a thicker conception of “public 
utility” in the traditional regulatory compact in order to tackle decarbonization of the grid); 
William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in 
Public Utility Law, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 810, 814 (2016) (advocating for “innovative ratemaking” 
in the public utility framework in order to “promot[e] technological innovation and deployment 
in the power sector”); Hammond & Spence, supra note 6, at 146–47 (developing a new 
understanding of the regulatory compact in a world of increasing market competition and 
environmental imperatives); Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public 
Utility Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 
371, 400–12 (2014) (proposing changes to PUC regulations to address climate change). 
 13.  See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 6, at 1723–30 (advocating for an “open access” principle to 
be applied to the distribution system akin to the deregulation of the transmission system that 
occurred under FERC in the 1990s and 2000s); IGNACIO PÉREZ-ARRIAGA ET AL., supra note 8, 
at x (observing that “structural reform that establishes financial independence between 
distribution system operation and planning functions and competitive market activities” would 
be the preferred economically efficient solution); Severin Borenstein, Time-Varying Retail 
Electricity Prices: Theory and Practice, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND 
CHALLENGES 325 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005) (noting that a real-time pricing 
fix to the competitive retail marketplace would “be the ideal in terms of economic efficiency”); 
Lester Lave, Jay Apt, & Seth Blumsack, Deregulation/Restructuring Part I: Reregulation Will Not 
Fix the Problems, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 9, 10 (2007) (decrying state-level efforts to halt deregulation 
and promoting instead changes in market design to enable greater competition). 
 14.  For instance, Joel Eisen argues that FERC has expansive authority to regulate the 
electricity grid and should use that authority to promote grid decarbonization through policies 
like demand response and a carbon adder. Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to 
Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C.D. L. REV. 1783, 1834–48 (2016). Alexandra Klass and 
Elizabeth Wilson also propose that FERC use its preemption powers to engage in “process 
preemption” in the siting of additional transmission line infrastructure and use soft powers to 
encourage states to join regional transmission compacts. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. 
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1857–73 (2012). 
 15.  For example, William Boyd and Ann Carlson argue that inaction at the federal level has 
allowed states to innovate subsidies for different forms of grid decarbonization. Boyd & Carlson, 
supra note 12, at 841–92. Shelley Welton suggests that local innovations in municipalization and 
community choice aggregation have allowed communities to reassert governance control over 
their own grids. Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 307–46 (2017). And 
Garrick Pursley and Hannah Wiseman advocate for devolution of power to municipal 
governments in order to encourage distributed energy resource adoption. Garrick B. Pursley & 
Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 931–55 (2011). 
 16.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving 
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But these discussions are making a threshold mistake: assuming 
that either the command-and-control model or the neoliberal market 
model—both ultimately top-down, centralized governance systems—
describes how the electricity grid actually works. In fact, neither of 
these models is correct. 
This article argues that we ought to think of the U.S. electricity 
system as a decentralized, nodal network. Not just in the physical sense 
(with a grid infrastructure composed of a series of nodes where 
electricity is produced and consumed, interconnected by a web of 
transmission lines along which electricity is delivered), but also in the 
theoretical sense. Inspired by the nodal governance model developed 
in the world of international security law,17 this article argues that the 
 
State and Local Voices in the Green Energy Revolution, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 
(2014) (arguing for a cooperative federalism model that preserves federal and state authority in 
energy regulation); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1657–80 
(2015) (applying a dynamic federalism model to Renewable Portfolio Standards and feed-in 
tariffs at the state and federal levels); Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra 
note 6, at 4–5 (proposing an “innovative model of energy governance” based on “hybrid 
institutions with strong regional components” to address federalism gaps and overlaps in energy 
law); Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 403 (2016) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court has “abandon[ed] dual sovereignty” in energy law and adopted 
instead a “concurrent federal-state” jurisdictional framework); Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past 
Dual Federalism to Advance Electric Grid Neutrality, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97, 100 (2015) 
(explaining that the dual federalism framework no longer fits the electricity system); Wiseman & 
Osofsky, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 6, at 814–40 (arguing that a dynamic federalism 
model with overlapping horizontal and vertical jurisdictional lines describes the energy law 
landscape better than a dual federalism approach and discussing the governance issues that arise 
from this overlap). 
 17.  See generally DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY (Jennifer 
Wood & Benoit Dupont eds., 2009); JENNIFER WOOD & CLIFFORD SHEARING, IMAGINING 
SECURITY (2007); Scott Burris, Peter Drahos, & Clifford Shearing, Nodal Governance, 30 AUST. 
J. LEG. PHIL. 30 (2005); Clifford Shearing & Jennifer Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and 
the New ‘Denizens,’ 30 J. L. & SOC. 400 (2003); Jennifer Wood & Clifford Shearing, Security and 
Nodal Governance, Prepared for Seminar at Temple University Beasley School of Law, 
Philadelphia (Oct. 25, 2006). Although this article draws principally from the nodal governance 
literature, the idea of a non-hierarchical, multi-nodal governance framework is by no means 
isolated to the international security law field. For discussions of similar models in the 
administrative and constitutional law fields, see, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in the Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–48 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1368–69 (2003); Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals: 
Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and 
Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1063–74 (2000). In the international law field, see, e.g., 
HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS & INNOVATIONS (Thomas Hale 
& David Held eds., 2011); Anne-Marie Slaughter & Thomas N. Hale, Transgovernmental 
Networks, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE (Mark Bevir, ed., 2011); 
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electricity grid is best described as a series of nonhierarchical 
relationships that rely on groups (or “nodes”) of actors consolidating 
their power and using formal and informal connections (“networks”) 
to manage a course of events. There is no single centralized decision-
making entity on the grid. 
In fact, looking more closely at the history of the electricity grid, 
it becomes clear that the grid has always operated as a nodal network, 
even during phases characterized as command-and-control or 
neoliberal. Informal actors that survived along the grid’s edge, not 
captured by the standardized governance frameworks, often dictated 
the flow of events. And the changes that we see in grid governance are 
not shifts between two top-down governing phases, but rather the 
constant evolution of a nodal governance model that has grown more 
complex and interconnected over time. 
Beyond the simple fact that it is descriptively correct, the nodal 
governance model is helpful for three reasons. 
First, it allows us to create an accurate topography of the current 
grid governance structure and identify the different players and 
decision-making processes that determine how our grid actually 
functions, which is often overlooked in a top-down narrative. (For 
those policymakers and activists looking to make changes on the grid—
even to address some of the grid challenges named above—this 
topography is a useful starting point, as it suggests different pressure 
points and paths of action.) 
Second, building on that topography, we can see the benefits that 
a nodal governance structure provides: the decentralized nature of the 
grid offers governance advantages akin to those that we see in other 
decentralized systems, such as preference maximization; competition 
and the minimization of externalities; policy experimentation; local 
governance; and minority rule and dissent, to name a few. Such a 
topography thus provides potential solutions to intractable policy 
 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION (Marie-Laure 
Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, eds., 2006). In the technology sphere, see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, 
Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017); Orly Lobel, The Law of the 
Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016); Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and 
Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHIC. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116 (2015). 
And in the organizational management world, see, e.g., Keith G. Provan & Patrick Kenis, Modes 
of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH 
& THEORY 229 (2008); Peter Bogason & Juliet A. Musso, The Democratic Prospects of Network 
Governance, 36 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 3 (2006); Daniel J. Brass et al., Taking Stock of Networks 
and Organizations: A Multilevel Perspective, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 795 (2004); Candace Jones, 
William S. Hesterly, & Stephen P. Borgatti, A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange 
Conditions and Social Mechanisms, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 911 (1997). 
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problems that have stalled under a top-down governance framework, 
including movements to regionalize California’s electricity grid or to 
decarbonize the electricity grid through a Green New Deal-style 
program. 
Third, we can see that these benefits may be threatened by a grid 
jurisprudence premised on an incorrect, top-down understanding of 
the grid. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court adopted an 
interpretation of the Federal Power Act (the federal law governing the 
electricity grid) that prioritizes certain governing nodes over others. 
That interpretation, which has already resulted in a flurry of litigation 
in the federal courts, could lead to a concentration of power at the 
federal level and an upending of the current nodal structure of the 
electricity grid precisely when it is needed most. 
This article proceeds in five parts. Part I presents the conventional 
history of the electricity grid based on the top-down, command-and-
control and neoliberal models. Part II develops a revised (and more 
accurate) grid history based on the nodal governance model, then uses 
that model to map out the topography of our modern electricity grid. 
Part III lists the governance and policy benefits of a nodal network 
approach to the electricity grid. Part IV explains how nodal governance 
is currently under attack. Part V concludes. 
The legal and policy implications of a nodal governance approach 
to the electricity grid discussed in this article are only the tip of the 
iceberg. Nodal governance could prove useful to a whole host of 
modern grid problems, ranging from the ongoing disputes within states 
over how to transform distribution utilities into platform-based 
ecosystems where individual homes and communities can buy and sell 
electricity18 to the possibility of a “smart home” future where the home 
itself is populated with new automated, electricity-intensive devices, 
such as appliances, heating and cooling systems, sensory lighting, and 
 
 18.  The New York Public Service Commission’s Renewable Energy Vision proceeding is 
the most prominent example of this move towards a platform-based distribution utility platform. 
See PROCEEDING ON MOTION OF THE COMMISSION IN REGARD TO REFORMING THE ENERGY 
VISION, 319 P.U.R.4th 1 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 26, 2015) (order). The California PUC 
has also issued a white paper raising the prospect that the state will transition to a similar 
customer-participation-focused retail model. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, CONSUMER AND 
RETAIL CHOICE, THE ROLE OF THE UTILITY, AND AN EVOLVING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: 
STAFF WHITE PAPER (2017). And MIT’s Utility of the Future report argues that a platform-based 
distribution utility model would be preferable in order to encourage the development of a more 
advanced electricity grid. See IGNACIO PÉREZ-ARRIAGA ET AL., supra note 8, at x. 
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security systems. This article does not aspire to tackle all of these 
issues, but rather to lay the groundwork for a nodal governance 
approach to the electricity grid. Such an adaptive and innovative 
framework can then be used to address the problems that arise as 
Americans build an electricity grid fit for the future. 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL HISTORY OF THE U.S. ELECTRICITY GRID 
What follows is the conventional story of governance theory, as 
told by nodal governance scholars19—which, incidentally, maps 
perfectly onto the conventional story of grid governance told by most 
grid policymakers and experts. Both stories begin with two standard 
ways of conceptualizing governance: a top-down, command-and-
control model (under which the state directly dictates the behavior of 
private actors), and a regulated marketplace or neoliberal model 
(under which the state harnesses economic forces to direct the choices 
of private actors). According to this conventional governance theory, 
the history of governance is the history of command-and-control states 
transitioning to neoliberal states. According to most legal scholars and 
policymakers, the history of the governance of the U.S. electricity grid 
follows the same pattern: the electricity grid began as a command-and-
control model, then transitioned into a neoliberal model. 
A. The Command-and-Control Model 
We begin first with the command-and-control model, which, in the 
conventional story, owes its origins to the writings of Thomas Hobbes. 
In his seminal work, Leviathan, Hobbes theorized that the State, rising 
out of the state of nature, gains a monopoly over the legitimate exercise 
of power via a social contract consented to by the people.20 The people 
give up their right to autonomy and self-governance in return for the 
State’s promise to provide protection and security. The Hobbesian 
model assumes that governance is a centralized, top-down, command-
and-control system in which the State is the ultimate source of power 
 
 19.  The governance history recounted in this section comes from the literature on nodal 
governance composed by Clifford Shearing, Jennifer Wood, and other security law scholars. See 
generally DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 17; WOOD 
& SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 2–20; Wood & Shearing, Security and 
Nodal Governance, supra note 17, at 1–7. 
 20.  See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1968); Clifford Shearing, Reflections on 
the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in  DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE 
GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 17, at 19–21; WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING 
SECURITY, supra note 17, at 9–10. 
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and decision-making.21 Although the State can designate other, more 
technically competent agents to execute its commands, the 
determination of the end goals remains within the State itself because, 
under the social contract, it is only this body that can decide the will of 
the people.22 Figure 1 presents a diagram of the command-and-control 
model, in which decision-making originates at the top and flows down 
a hierarchical pyramid. 
 
 Figure 1. Representation of a command-and-control governance 
framework. Power flows from the top down, and the bottom layer 
(signifying private actors) has little input in everyday governance 
choices. 
The conventional history of the U.S. electricity grid likewise says 
that the first phase of grid governance followed this Hobbesian model. 
Out of a state of nature emerged a centralized governance system 
charged with defining and acting on behalf of the common good under 
the blessing of the social contract. To wit: in 1882, the modern 
electricity grid is born when Thomas Edison performs the first large-
scale commercial test of his electric lightbulb.23 Shortly thereafter, 
 
 21.  WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 8. 
 22.  Id. at 9–10. 
 23.  JACK CASAZZA & FRANK DELEA, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: AN 
OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY, THE MARKETPLACE, AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION 2 (2d ed. 
2010). 
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hundreds of “electric lighting” companies popped up around the 
country, using Edison’s technology and the lure of the lightbulb as the 
means of establishing small, decentralized grids, mostly private and 
mostly for the wealthy.24 The wild state of numerous small-scale grids 
was quickly followed by consolidation at the hands of a few big players 
in the electricity field: Edison’s company (which later became General 
Electric), Westinghouse, and Houston-Thomson.25 
But the real leviathan of this emerging command-and-control 
ecosystem was Samuel Insull, Edison’s protégé and the instigator of the 
public utility model.26 While running the Chicago Edison Company, 
Insull realized that the secret to increasing the company’s revenues was 
not attracting wealthy customers with luxury prices but rather 
broadening the customer base by lowering prices and recruiting a 
diverse set of consumers.27 This model made the large central turbine 
powering the grid—increasingly the preferred technology for electric 
utilities—more efficient and cost-effective.28 Furthermore, if electric 
utility companies could capture a large set of customers in a single area, 
the duplicative transmission lines strung by competing electric lighting 
companies in cities across the country could be eliminated. Insull 
concluded that a monopoly structure was the best answer to both the 
consumer and capital problems that his industry faced.29 Moreover, this 
would not be just a simple monopoly, but a regulated monopoly 
whereby the state oversaw rate and service standards for the electricity 
companies and the companies were granted an exclusive franchise 
territory in return.30 
Thus began the electric utility version of the Hobbesian social 
contract—the “regulatory compact.”31 The regulatory compact 
envisioned a straightforward exchange: “In return for an exclusive 
 
 24.  Id. at 2–3; GRETCHEN BAKKE, THE GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN 
AMERICANS AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE 199 (2016); THOMAS HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER: 
ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880-1930, at 204 (1983). 
 25.  PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR 
ELECTRIFIED WORLD 52, 58 (2007). 
 26.  Id. at 67–80. 
 27.  Id. at 67–69; HUGHES, supra note 24, at 217. 
 28.  SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 67–68. 
 29.  HUGHES, supra note 24, at 206–08, 211–12, 216–17; see also Richard D. Cudahy & 
William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall 
of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 42 (2005). 
 30.  HUGHES, supra note 24, at 206–07. 
 31.  See, e.g., Boyd, Public Utility, supra note 6, at 1643 n.106; KARL MCDERMOTT, EDISON 
ELEC. INST., COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY 
INDUSTRY 5–8 (2012). 
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franchise, the right of eminent domain, and an ability to sell electricity 
at reasonable rates, electric utilities would provide reliable, universal 
service and forgo some of the profits that might be attainable in the 
absence of regulation.”32 Like the social contract, the regulatory 
compact required that the people give up their freedom to choose 
amongst a variety of competitive electricity companies and cede 
decision-making authority to the public utility commission (PUC) and 
the utility itself in return for a guarantee that the regulated utility 
would provide for the common good—i.e., providing low-cost 
electricity to all customers within its domain.33 
To implement the regulatory compact, states passed public utility 
laws requiring utilities to set “just and reasonable” rates. PUCs were 
formed and instructed to determine what constituted reasonable 
expenses and profits for the electricity business.34 In most cases, this 
involved cost-of-service ratemaking, or heavily factual and technically 
complex administrative proceedings that required utilities and 
regulators to determine the “actual prudent costs” necessary to allow 
electric utilities to operate effectively.35 Utilities were then allowed to 
set electricity rates sufficient to cover their costs and earn a fair return 
on investment. 
The regulatory compact spread like wildfire across the electricity 
business. Between 1907 and 1930, every state but Delaware passed 
public utility laws that formed PUCs in order to regulate entities like 
electricity companies.36 Meanwhile, Insull and his fellow electric utility 
monopolists flourished. By the end of the 1920s, ten electric utility 
holding companies controlled three quarters of the electricity 
 
 32.  Boyd, supra note 6, at 1643. 
 33.  See MCDERMOTT, supra note 31, at 6 (“Under this contract both the utility and 
consumers give up certain rights, or in contract law terms, exchange detriments. Utilities accept 
the obligation to serve and charge regulated cost-based rates, and customers accept limited entry 
(i.e., loss of choice) for protection from monopoly pricing. This bargain represents an ongoing 
mutual relationship between the owners of the utility (and their agents) and the customers; in 
effect, a relational contract overseen by the regulator.”). 
 34.  For a good explanation of the development of the case law regarding ratemaking, see 
Boyd, supra note 6, at 1644–46. 
 35.  MCDERMOTT, supra note 31, at 6. Rate-making cases consider such variables as the total 
revenue for the company; the total costs incurred by the company; the rate base or value of capital; 
the accumulated depreciation of the capital; the average cost of capital; the company’s operating 
expenses; annual depreciation costs; and any taxes the utility paid. Id. at 8. 
 36.  Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 823. 
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industry.37 Together, the regulators and the utilities engaged in what 
historian Richard Hirsh describes as the “utility consensus,” or the 
agreement amongst electric utility executives, progressive era 
reformers, public utility commissioners, and economists that the 
electricity industry constituted a natural monopoly that required a 
single service provider in a franchised area, subject to direct state 
monitoring.38 
In the decades that followed, according to the traditional version 
of electric grid history, top-down, centralized government regulation 
of the electricity industry became the norm. In fact, by some metrics, 
regulatory oversight of the system increased: in 1934, Congress passed 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act, requiring holding companies 
that held assets crossing state lines to register with the newly-formed 
Securities and Exchange Commission and abide by its financial 
regulations.39 The next year, Congress also passed the Federal Power 
Act, giving the federal government regulatory authority over 
wholesale sales and transmission of electricity that occurred 
interstate.40 Around the same time, Congress created the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA), a power project that involved the federal 
government playing a direct role in the production and sale of 
electricity.41 
For the next sixty years, so the story goes, very little changed in 
electricity governance. Command-and-control regulation of the 
electricity monopoly ostensibly produced a steady stream of profits,42 
consistent declines in the price of electricity,43 and capital investment 
large enough to build giant, centralized power plants and an intricate 
 
 37.  BAKKE, supra note 24, at 69–70. 
 38.  See generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (1999); see also BAKKE, 
supra note 24, at 70. 
 39.  CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 23, at 214–15. 
 40.  See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–824w (2012). 
 41.  SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 94–106. For more information on the TVA, see generally 
NORTH CALLAHAN, TVA: BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS (1980); WALTER L. CREESE, 
TVA’S PUBLIC PLANNING: THE VISION, THE REALITY (1990); STEVEN M. NEUSE, DAVID E. 
LILIENTHAL: THE JOURNEY OF AN AMERICAN LIBERAL 64–120 (1996). 
 42.  From the inception of the industry until the 1970s, electricity consumption doubled 
every decade. CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 23, at 4. 
 43.  Retail price increases would not be seen until the 1970s. Paul Joskow, The Difficult 
Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United States, in ELECTRICITY 
DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 31, 35 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller, eds., 
2005). 
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web of transmission lines stretching across the entire country.44 Then, 
as a series of external shocks rocked the electricity system—the 1970s 
oil crisis, a drop in demand for electricity accompanied by an efficiency 
plateau for large turbines, and the beginnings of the environmental 
movement45—the command-and-control system faltered, and the stage 
was set for the transition to the next stage of governance: the neoliberal 
marketplace. 
B. The Neoliberal Model 
According to the conventional governance story, while the 
Hobbesian model is a useful starting point for describing how 
centralized bodies wield power, it is incomplete. In particular, the 
command-and-control model fails to account for the effects of 
economic forces (namely, the free market ideas developed by classical 
liberals like Adam Smith and John Locke). The neoliberal model of 
governance is an attempt to respond to this deficiency. It combines the 
political characteristics of the State developed in the command-and-
control model with the free market of classical liberalism to produce a 
regulated marketplace governance model.46 
Importantly, the neoliberal model does not eschew the 
centralized, top-down existence of the State. Under neoliberalism, the 
State continues to decide the goals of governance, but markets are used 
to execute those goals.47 Some neoliberal scholars use the analogy of 
“steering” and “rowing”:48 the State steers the ship, while markets are 
responsible for rowing it in the chosen direction.49 The State guides the 
“rowing” by setting the rules of the market, policing the market for bad 
actors, or even dictating the economic terms of the market by 
contracting for market goods itself.50 Thus, both the Hobbesian model 
 
 44.  LORRIN PHILIPSON & H. LEE WILLIS, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND  
DE-REGULATION 94 (2d ed. 2006). 
 45.  BAKKE, supra note 24, at 86–90. 
 46.  WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 10. 
 47.  Id. at 10–11. 
 48.  See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW 
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992). 
 49.  Shearing, Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in 
DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 17, at 22; Wood & 
Shearing, Security and Nodal Governance, supra note 17, at 2. 
 50.  Wood & Shearing, Security and Nodal Governance, supra note 17, at 2–4. 
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and the neoliberal model embrace top-down, hierarchical systems of 
government, even if the neoliberal model also disaggregates power 
from one form (political) into two (political and economic).51 Figure 2 
presents a diagram of the neoliberal model; the blue arrows represent 
political forces, while the red arrows represent economic forces. 
 
 Figure 2. Representation of a neoliberal governance framework. 
Political power still flows from the top down (signified by the blue 
arrows), but private actors can also interact with each other via 
economic exchanges in regulated marketplaces (signified by the red 
arrows). In this example, two separate marketplaces are shown. 
Similarly, the conventional story of U.S. electricity grid 
governance says that the second phase of grid governance began with 
the development of the neoliberal model. That story proceeds as 
follows: beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the electricity 
industry had experienced external shocks to its system, policymakers 
seized on the notion that the problem with the electricity system was a 
failure to allow the free market to “row” the ship of low-cost electricity. 
To remedy this, regulators set about dismantling the regulatory 
compact in favor of a market-based approach. 
The breakup of the utility monopoly began at the federal level. In 
1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act, which directed the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to order utilities to 
open up their interstate transmission lines so that any generator—as 
 
 51.  Shearing, Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in 
DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 17, at 21–22. 
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part of a regulated utility company or not—could sell their electricity 
at the wholesale level.52 Shortly thereafter, FERC adopted Orders 
88853 and 889,54 which mandated that all public utilities that owned or 
operated interstate transmission facilities file “open access tariffs” with 
FERC certifying that their transmission services would be run in a 
“non-discriminatory” manner.55 By removing the exclusive franchise at 
the generation level and putting in place incentives for independent 
generators to enter into the market, Congress and FERC hoped to turn 
electricity into a commodity—tradable on a competitive marketplace 
just like any other good.56 
Then, in 1999, FERC adopted Order 2000. This rule created 
voluntary, independent transmission organizations in the form of 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) to manage the 
transmission lines, develop long-term transmission planning, run 
wholesale markets where electricity could be bought and sold in 
competitive auctions, and ensure that access was enforced in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.57 Two years later, FERC issued a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on Standard Market Design that would have 
made participation in RTOs mandatory for all interstate buyers and 
sellers of electricity.58 
 
 52.  Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992 — A Watershed 
for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. REG. 447, 449 (1993). 
 53.  Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and 
Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 
(1996) [hereinafter Order 888]. 
 54.  Open Access Same-Time Information System (formerly Real-Time Information 
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,037 (1996), 61 
Fed. Reg. 21,737 (1996) [hereinafter Order 889]. 
 55.  See Order 888, supra note 53. 
 56.  BAKKE, supra note 24, at 138. 
 57.  Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 
(1999), 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (2000) [hereinafter Order 2000], on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, FERC 
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,092, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (2000) [hereinafter Order 2000-A]. 
 58.  See Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and 
Standard Electricity Market Design, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,563 (2002), 67 Fed. Reg. 55,451 
(Aug. 29, 2002). This proposed rulemaking was suspended in the wake of the California electricity 
crisis and state resistance towards further deregulation of the electricity system. See Remedying 
Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity 
Market Design, Order Terminating Proceeding, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 61,073 (2005), 70 Fed. 
Reg. 43,140 (July 26, 2005); see also Mary Anne Sullivan, Joseph C. Bell, & John R. Lilyestrom, 
Standard Market Design: What Went Wrong? What Next?, 16 ELECTRICITY J. 11 (2003). 
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Meanwhile, the states were embarking on competitive retail 
market efforts of their own. By 1991, thirty-six states had required their 
regulated utilities to engage in a competitive bidding process to secure 
additional generation capacity.59 In 1998, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
and California set in place programs to break apart the utilities’ retail 
monopolies and offer greater choice to customers.60 By 1999, according 
to FERC, “twenty-one states had enacted electric restructuring 
legislation, three had issued comprehensive regulatory orders, and 
twenty-six states plus the District of Columbia had legislation or orders 
pending or investigations underway.”61 
California in particular approached the neoliberalization of the 
retail market with fervor. In 1992, California’s PUC began exploring 
options to open up the state’s private utilities to market competition.62 
In 1996, California’s legislature passed Assembly Bill 1890, putting in 
place several principles for electricity restructuring that would go into 
effect in 1998: (1) direct access, allowing all customers to purchase 
electricity from any provider, regardless of whether they fell within its 
franchise territory; (2) the transfer of transmission operations to the 
California Independent System Operator (CAISO), akin to FERC’s 
RTO model; (3) the creation of the California Power Exchange (PX), 
a “spot” market for wholesale electricity purchases open to both 
investor-owned utilities and independent power generators; and (4) a 
freeze on retail electricity rates set at 1996 levels in order to allow cost 
recovery for utilities forced into a competitive market model.63 Under 
California’s restructuring approach, the utilities were required to 
divest at least 50% of their generation assets and were strongly 
encouraged to divest the remainder.64 They were also banned from 
 
 59.  Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 454 n.28. The states had also already engaged in some 
competitive wholesale expansion by adopting utility contracting requirements for non-utility 
power wholesalers that were either cogeneration facilities or renewable energy generators. Id. at 
452. This movement sprang from several seemingly innocuous lines in the 1978 federal Public 
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”), intended to encourage greater energy efficiency in 
the wake of the oil crisis. Id. 
 60.  Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United States, 
in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION, supra note 43, at 32. 
 61.  Order 2000, supra note 57. 
 62.  JAMES L. SWEENEY, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS 26 (2002). At the time, 
investor-owned utilities served 78% of California customers. Id. at 7. 
 63.  Act of September 23, 1996, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 854 (codified at CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
CODE §§ 330–398.5); Provisions of AB 1890, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/assemblybill.html (last visited Apr. 
5, 2018). 
 64.  SWEENEY, supra note 62, at 61. 
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securing generation via long-term, bilateral contracts; instead, they had 
to conduct all of their wholesale electricity purchases on the spot 
market or the CAISO wholesale market.65 
The results were not encouraging. Wholesale market prices for 
electricity in June and July of 2000 increased 270% from the same 
period in 1999.66 The state experienced frequent rolling blackouts, with 
almost 100 declared power emergencies in 2000 and more than 150 in 
2001.67 One of California’s three largest investor-owned utilities, 
Pacific Gas & Electric, declared bankruptcy in April 2001.68 To staunch 
the bleeding, both California and FERC issued price caps; the 
California PX was closed and utilities were permitted to once again 
contract outside of the market for generation; and the California PUC 
suspended direct access (or retail choice) in the state.69 
In the wake of the California electricity crisis, whereas before 
around half of the states had been exploring options to transition 
towards retail competition or were in the early stages of doing so, only 
fifteen soldiered on.70 FERC, having received backlash on its proposal 
to convert all states to the regional wholesale market model, rescinded 
its rulemaking. Although FERC continued to issue improvements in 
RTO design and implementation, the concerted and enthusiastic effort 
to move the electricity industry to a neoliberal framework stalled. 
Today, the U.S. electricity grid sits in an ad hoc limbo, with some states 
containing “restructured” retail markets, some governed by RTOs, and 
some engaging in traditional ratemaking cases.71 
This is where the conventional story of U.S. electricity grid 
governance ends. With no alternative to the command-and-control 
model or the neoliberal model, and with no ability to see the history of 
grid governance as anything but the evolution between those two 
 
 65.  Id. at 61–64; see also Frank A. Wolak, Lessons from the California Electricity Crisis, in 
GRIFFIN & PULLER, ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION 145, 145–78 (2005). 
 66.  Subsequent Events – California’s Electricity Crisis, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/subsequentevents.html 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id.; see also Wolak, supra note 65, at 158–65; see generally SWEENEY, supra note 62. 
 70.  Boyd, supra note 6, at 1668. 
 71.  See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 818–38 (summarizing existing state of hybrid 
electricity markets). 
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models, legal scholars and policymakers are left debating the merits 
and demerits of the two hierarchical governance systems.72 But as 
critics tear apart the flaws of both governance systems as applied to the 
electricity grid, and as neither system seems particularly well-suited to 
govern the grid of today, no consensus for grid governance has 
emerged. Meanwhile, problems facing the grid proliferate, and the grid 
is left with no governing blueprint ready to bring it into the future. 
II. NODAL GOVERNANCE AND THE U.S. ELECTRICITY GRID 
While the conventional story of the electricity grid told in Part I 
grasps some of the superficial elements of grid governance, it misses 
the nuance and driving forces underneath. As a result, the narrative 
provides little guidance for how policymakers and scholars should 
approach grid governance moving forward. A new model of 
governance is needed to understand how the grid actually functioned 
in the past, and how it ought to function today. That is where nodal 
governance comes into play. Nodal governance is a theory of 
governance arising from the realm of international security law that 
describes a decentralized model of decision-making.73 It recognizes 
that a variety of actors, not just the State or the private sector 
responding to economic incentives, have the ability to influence events 
in the world. This decentralized model gives a more accurate historical 
account of the grid and reveals power dynamics that are ignored in the 
conventional story. As a result, it is more useful for describing the 
electricity grid today, unearthing the kaleidoscope of players and 
decision-making processes that actually dictate grid outcomes. 
A. The Nodal Governance Model 
Nodal governance is a governance model that developed in 
international security law in order to account for the bevy of non-state 
actors that wield force alongside the traditional conception of the 
State.74 For nodal governance scholars, looking at the mass of private 
 
 72.  See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying citations. 
 73.  See supra note 17 and accompanying citations. 
 74.  See id. While I rely heavily on the international security law literature for my nodal 
governance model, the idea appears in other disciplines as well. See id. Many scholars have 
recognized that non-hierarchical, decentralized, pluralistic governance models better describe the 
landscape of power in the real world than stylized, top-down systems. But often these models are 
discussed in the context of more traditional American institutional frameworks—for instance, 
constitutional law, see Metzger, supra note 17, at 1373 (proposing “a new constitutional analysis 
of privatization”), or administrative law, see Freeman, supra note 17, at 546 (observing that “[t]he 
time has come” for “the discipline of administrative law to grapple with private power”). That is 
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firms, think tanks, non-state actors, media organizations, political 
parties, non-governmental organizations, and civil society entities that 
populate the modern world, it was unrealistic to think that governing 
power comes from just one source.75 Governance itself also must be 
disaggregated. As one such scholar has explained: 
What one has in practice is not a single model of governance, but a 
complex of hybrid arrangements and practices in which different 
mentalities of governance as well as very different sets of 
institutional arrangements coexist. We have not simply witnessed a 
shift away from direct command and control governance to forms of 
indirect state governance that operate through market mechanisms 
or through the gentle touch of persuasion associated with               
third-sector mobilization. Rather, we have a complex set of 
relationships in which ‘steerers’ and ‘rowers’ constitute relationships 
and align their interests.76 
When you tear apart the hierarchical conception of governance 
entirely, you end up with a “nodal” view of governance.77 Under this 
view, no one entity monopolizes governance decisions.78 Instead, a 
variety of actors—legislatures, government agencies, neighborhood 
associations, non-governmental organizations, firms, and media 
conglomerates—use their expertise, resources, and technologies to set 
governance goals. They then use economic, political, social, 
informational, propagandistic, and other forms of power to “cajole,” 
“coerce,” or otherwise direct those they wish to control to fall into 
compliance with their aims.79 Moreover, under this view of governance, 
 
not my focus. Instead, I am more interested in the construct of the grid’s nodal network itself: 
what “nodes” and “networks” actually exist, and how they are leveraged to produce change. For 
that reason, I draw primarily from the international security law literature, which is more 
concerned with the actual scaffolding of the nodal network than with fitting such a network into 
other legal frameworks. That is not to say that other literature on the topic is not relevant. Jody 
Freeman’s theory of governance as “a set of negotiated relationships” that can include both 
“private” and “public” actors, id. at 571, for instance, is an excellent description of what I am 
interested in here—namely, how a variety of actors with their own interests and authority wield 
their power to influence the governing choices of others. 
 75.  WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 13; Burris, Drahos, & 
Shearing, Nodal Governance, supra note 17, at 31–32. 
 76.  WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 21. 
 77.  Id. at 21–28; see also Orly Lobel, The Renewal Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise 
of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 262, 297 (2004). 
 78.  WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 21–28; Burris, Drahos, & 
Shearing, supra note 17, at 47. 
 79.  Burris, Drahos, & Shearing, supra note 17, at 39. 
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the “time” of governance must be disrupted as much as its “space”: the 
“nodes” and “networks” of people and power are “constantly 
reconstituting themselves” as new organizations form and new 
connections of influence are established in response to changing 
environments and shifting alliances.80 
The end result is a decentralized theory of governance that is best 
represented as a collection of dots connected by a multitude of lines 
rather than a hierarchical pyramid that assumes a single, dominant 
point. A diagram of nodal governance is shown in Figure 3, in which 
the multi-colored lines signify different forms of power that actors can 
use to influence events in the world. 
 
 Figure 3. Representation of a decentralized nodal governance 
framework. Power flows from a variety of different “nodes” (the blue 
circles) or players across the network, some more powerful or 
interconnected than others. The multi-colored arrows represent 
different forms of power or influence—economic, top-down 
regulatory, direct self-governance, informational, or social—that the 
nodes can use to control events on the network. 
B. A Revised Grid History 
Revisiting the history of the U.S. electricity grid with the nodal 
governance model in mind, it becomes clear that this model best 
 
 80.  Id. at 40; Shearing & Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens,’ 
supra note 17, at 404. 
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describes how governance and power were actually deployed on the 
grid. In fact, a closer examination of grid history reveals the informal 
nodes and networks that hummed outside of the formal legal systems 
all along, and how these out-of-system actors kept the grid intact and 
steered its course. Take the example of voluntary power pools and 
small-scale independent generation sources. Both had tremendous 
influence over events on the grid, yet neither are captured by the 
standard governance narrative. Nonetheless, both fit seamlessly into 
the framework of a nodal governance approach. These examples 
demonstrate that the history of grid governance is best understood as 
the constant evolution of a nodal governance model that has grown 
more complex and interconnected over time, rather than a stepwise 
transition from a command-and-control to a neoliberal model. 
1. Voluntary Power Pools 
One of the most prominent critiques of the conventional grid story 
comes in the form of the voluntary power pools of the twentieth 
century. As the conventional story would have it, the U.S. electricity 
grid existed in a “highly balkanized” state during the command-and-
control phase, during which each utility stayed within its own 
monopoly jurisdiction.81 But in reality, very early on in the formation 
of the grid, the electric utilities sua sponte created an interconnected 
grid that saw utilities swapping electricity across jurisdictional lines and 
defying the monopoly model. These interconnections, known as 
“voluntary power pools,” were formed by utility operators seeking to 
share engineering expertise and maintain grid stability. Eventually, the 
pools morphed into informal wholesale markets and, later, into 
regional markets overseen by FERC in the reforms of the 1990s. The 
pools also represent a classic nodal governance relationship: private 
firms acting independently to control events on the grid through means 
other than top-down governance or market competition. 
From almost the very beginning of the grid, the electric utilities 
realized that some level of inter-coordination was necessary to keep 
 
 81.  Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of 
Restructuring 5–6 (Energy Inst. at Haas, Working Paper No. 252R, May 2015), 
https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/WP252.pdf. 
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the grid functioning.82 Reliability demands83 and the high costs of 
creating and building new technologies84 convinced electricity 
companies—without any pressure from centralized governance 
systems—that they should design grid infrastructure that was 
interoperable. That is, the technologies of each utility were compatible: 
utilities’ transmission lines, interties, voltage converters, frequency 
levels, and other systems could all be used by rival utilities. The 
utilities’ organizational structures were compatible as well: the 
companies developed communication channels between their 
engineers and operators so that rival utilities could share generation 
and transmission resources.85 As the historian Julie Cohn describes it, 
in the early days of grid development, “thousands of engineers, system 
operators, manufacturers, and academics” joined together to create 
“information exchange networks” that “provided opportunities for 
collaboration, critique, and the development of voluntary standards, 
especially for power control and reliability,” all without the guidance 
of “designated governing authorities.”86 
Over time, these experts developed what they called “power 
pools,” or cross-jurisdictional arrangements between utilities in which 
the utilities aggregated their generation assets and determined the 
least-cost configuration for dispatch at any given time87—in essence, 
voluntary wholesale markets.88 The power pools operated differently 
depending on the region: in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey pool, the 
utilities organized an “operating agreement” under which “each 
member utility designated one person to serve on an operating 
committee, which then established the policies for operations, 
 
 82.  See JULIE A. COHN, THE GRID: BIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 21 
(2017) (describing the example of the Southern California Power Company and the Redlands 
Electric Light and Power Company in California, two separate companies in the early formation 
of the grid who had their “own financial obligations to investors and [their] own customer base” 
but nonetheless engaged in “[p]ower sharing” arrangements to aid in each other’s electricity 
production and distribution). 
 83.  Id. at 26. 
 84.  CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
 85.  COHN, supra note 82, at 8; see also CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 23, at 24. 
 86.  COHN, supra note 82, at 27. 
 87.  Catherine Wolfram, The Efficiency of Electricity Generation in the United States After 
Restructuring, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION, supra note 43, at  227, 231; see also PHILIPSON 
& WILLIS, supra note 44, at 49–50. 
 88.  See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 831; Boyd, supra note 6, at 1674; Michael H. 
Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public Interest in the 
Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organization, 28 ENERGY L.J. 554 
(2007). 
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exchanges of energy, and forecasts of loads.”89 The operating 
agreement even had member utilities share planning activities.90 Other 
power pools were less formal. Some “used loose arrangements, 
effected by a handshake”; some were regional; some operated only 
within one state.91 
These voluntary nodes were not just technically resourceful, 
however; they were also politically nimble. For instance, during the 
1940s, the Roosevelt Administration expressed interest in taking over 
all of the regionally interconnected grids in order to further the war 
effort.92 In response, the utilities formed more interties and tightened 
their governance structures to prove that they could run the 
interconnected grid without government oversight. The federal 
government, acquiescing, waived its interstate jurisdiction and allowed 
companies to continue to join regional pools without subjecting 
themselves to federal control.93 
Twenty years later, federal regulators again attempted to seize 
oversight of the grid interconnections. They released a National Power 
Survey in 1964 proposing that a national grid system and accompanying 
governance and planning body be adopted.94 Anticipating the report, 
the utilities united in 1963 to form the North American Power Systems 
Interconnection Committee (“NAPSIC”), which—by interconnecting 
seven existing power pools—created the largest synchronized grid in 
the world.95 As Julie Cohn describes it: 
With the creation of NAPSIC, the power industry had finally 
established an entity that had eluded large utilities, politicians, and 
engineers for decades. The independent interconnected systems 
 
 89.  COHN, supra note 82, at 64. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 104; see also PHILIPSON & WILLIS, supra note 44 at 50 (“[U]tilities in both Texas 
and California were pretty much linked together in pools which covered each state but did not 
stray too far over state boundaries. Sometimes the pools covered multiple states, as for example 
the power pool that interconnected utilities in New York and New England, or the Southwest 
Power Pool, which was formed by utilities in Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, and parts of 
surrounding states.”). 
 92.  COHN, supra note 82, at 106, 108, 110. Hardware companies even developed to cater to 
the special technological needs of grids that could be operated jointly or separately. Id. at 97–99. 
 93.  Id. at 109–17. 
 94.  Id. at 124; see also FED. POWER COMM’N, NATIONAL POWER SURVEY: A REPORT BY 
THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 1 (1964). 
 95.  See COHN, supra note 82, at 143–44; N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., NERC 
OPERATING MANUAL 1 (2016). 
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created NAPSIC without fanfare, publicity, political endorsement, 
or regulatory demand. NAPSIC served as a clearinghouse for 
stability issues for all the power companies, both public and private, 
that operated interconnected across the continent. In addition, at the 
outset, NAPSIC provided a forum for a level of national grid 
operation and some discussion of autonomous system plans 
unprecedented in the industry’s history. Yet through its very 
organizational structure, NAPSIC preserved the independence of 
government agencies, privately owned utilities, municipal 
companies, and rural cooperatives and respected the wide variety of 
systems developing across the continent. NAPSIC was the 
embodiment of shared responsibility and divided authority.96 
NAPSIC and the power pools continued operating relatively 
uninterrupted by government oversight for the next thirty years.97 It 
was not until the 1990s (coinciding with the so-called neoliberal phase) 
that the voluntary power pools were converted into formal structures 
overseen by the federal government. As FERC began to push for 
greater competition on the grid, regulators and industry participants 
alike recognized that some form of a regional organizing body was 
needed to manage load, dispatch, and capacity requirements without 
discrimination. Instead of subsuming that responsibility under FERC 
or creating new entities to manage transmission, FERC and the states 
turned to the preexisting power pools.98 These pools formed the first 
wholesale market operators that FERC eventually adopted and 
converted into RTOs.99 
There are two important observations to draw from this history of 
the voluntary power pools. First, there was no clean two-phase period 
in grid governance history marked by a “command-and-control” model 
and a “neoliberal” model. The wholesale markets that FERC 
implemented in the 1990s were not the brainchild of neoliberal 
reforms; they were engrafted solutions that utilities and engineering 
experts had been using to ensure grid stability and efficiency for almost 
one hundred years (although they had expanded and transformed as 
their roles developed under FERC orders). Second, the U.S. electricity 
grid was populated by unconventional, decentralized nodes that 
wielded power—through informational ties, political lobbying, and 
 
 96.  COHN, supra note 82, at 146. 
 97.  In 1980, NAPSIC was folded into the National Electric Reliability Council (“NERC”), 
another voluntary regional organization that came about through the utilities’ own initiative. Id. 
at 145, 167–70, 201. The formation of NERC is itself another excellent example of the network 
governance operation of the grid. 
 98.  Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 831. 
 99.  Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United States, 
in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION, supra note 43, at 51. 
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industry affiliations and collaborations—to influence events on the 
electricity grid. Neglecting these nodes and networks of power leaves 
out valuable information about the on-the-ground reality of grid 
operation. 
2. Independent Generation Sources 
A similar story could be told with regard to independent 
generation sources. The traditional narrative of grid governance says 
that market competition increased under—and as a direct result of—
the neoliberal transition. Moreover, this narrative presumes that no 
market competition existed during the command-and-control phase. 
But in reality, a barely noticed, offhand section in a piece of 1970s 
federal legislation that was intended to address energy efficiency 
opened up the industry to competition decades before the deregulatory 
efforts began within FERC. It was this statutory text that convinced 
experts that wholesale competition could be beneficial and helped spur 
the reforms of the 1990s. The independent generation sources 
supported by the statute are again examples of unconventional nodes 
unaccounted for in the standard governance models, despite their 
enormous influence. 
In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy 
Act (PURPA) in response to the oil crisis of 1973.100 PURPA was 
designed to encourage more efficient energy usage by promoting 
cogeneration facilities101 and favoring electricity produced by non-
fossil fuel generators (e.g., biomass, waste, geothermal, solar, and 
wind).102  
In particular, Section 210 of the Act—inserted by New Hampshire 
Senator John Durkin, who had a cogeneration facility in his district that 
needed a government boost103—said that utilities had to purchase 
electricity from cogenerators or small-scale, non-fossil fuel power 
producers if they cost the same as the “purchasing utility’s ‘incremental 
cost . . . of alternative electric energy,’ i.e., the purchaser’s avoided cost 
 
 100.  BAKKE, supra note 24, at 86–88. 
 101.  Cogeneration involves the “simultaneous production of electric energy plus steam, heat, 
or some other useful form of energy.” Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 452 n.20. 
 102.  Id. at 452 n.21. 
 103.  BAKKE, supra note 24, at 96. 
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to generate or purchase the same amount of electricity.”104 The 
statutory language was merely intended to promote energy 
conservation and reduce dependence on foreign oil; it was not meant 
to impact grid governance.105 But—to the surprise of the utilities as well 
as many policymakers—PURPA had an enormous effect on the 
wholesale market for electricity. By requiring utilities to purchase 
generation from small, independent sellers, PURPA broke the hold 
that vertically integrated utilities exercised over the generation 
market.106 As historian Phillip Schewe recounts: “[h]ere was something 
new in the electricity business. A small company, an unregulated 
company, could build modest generators and find a niche market. . . . 
Here was an opportunity for an energy entrepreneur to fit into the 
cracks between existing monopoly grid giants.”107 In fact, in the years 
after PURPA passed, small-scale independent generators accounted 
for more than half of new generation capacity built in the U.S.108 
In retrospect, PURPA was one of the key factors responsible for 
paving the way towards the reforms of the 1990s.109 First, the rapid 
uptake of these generators proved that non-utility generation could 
compete economically with utility generation, calling into question the 
usefulness of a monopoly model.110 Second, PURPA’s mandate that 
small-scale generators be used and compensated at the “avoided cost” 
of an additional utility installation motivated many state regulators to 
set costs via a competitive bidding process, foreshadowing today’s 
wholesale market auctions.111 Third, PURPA forced regulators away 
from the traditional cost-of-service ratemaking methodology and 
encouraged the adoption of a more competitive pay-for-performance 
standard.112 And finally, by focusing on avoided costs, PURPA 
encouraged state regulators to consider a wider variety of tools—
including demand-side management—in reaching customer needs, 
 
 104.  Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 453 (footnote omitted) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a-
3(b)). See also id. at 453 n.23. 
 105.  Id. at 453 &n.25; BAKKE, supra note 24, at 86–87; SCHEWE, supra note 25 at 172. 
 106.  BAKKE, supra note 24, at 95; see also Donna M. Attanasio, PURPA’s Public Power 
Impact (And What to Do About It), 5 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVT’L L. 1, 2 (2014). 
 107.  SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 175. 
 108.  Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 454, 454 n.27. 
 109.  See, e.g., Attanasio, supra note 106 at 1; BAKKE, supra note 24, at 87; FRANK GRAVES, 
PHILIP HANSER, & GREG BASHEDA, EDISON ELEC. INST., PURPA: MAKING THE SEQUEL 
BETTER THAN THE ORIGINAL 2 (2006); Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 454. 
 110.  Richard F. Hirsh, PURPA: The Spur to Competition and Utility Restructuring, 12 ELEC. 
J. 64 (1999). 
 111.  Id. at 66. 
 112.  Id. at 67–69. 
19. Gocke_ME Clean (Do Not Delete) 4/25/2019  12:42 PM 
232 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIX:205 
 
 
thus expanding the range of potential participants in the business 
beyond utility generators.113 
Altogether, the PURPA example yet again demonstrates the 
points made by the voluntary power pools: first, that history of grid 
governance is best understood as the evolution, expansion, and 
improvement upon preexisting models rather than the abrupt 
transition between a “command-and-control” and “neoliberal” phase; 
and second, that nodes unaccounted for in the standard governance 
models nonetheless harnessed their own forms of power to influence 
outcomes on the electricity grid. In the case of small-scale independent 
generators, that form of influence was all the more unique, as the 
generators were brought to life by a top-down mandate but survived 
under free-market economic principles (before any such market 
ostensibly existed). 
The same story of the influence of decentralized nodes on the U.S. 
electricity grid could be told about many grid entities.114 The takeaway 
of each of these stories, though, is that power was not just wielded in a 
top-down approach on the electricity grid, and that it was not just the 
State (or the State and regulated markets) that dictated grid events. 
Rather it was the actions of many decentralized actors, all of them 
asserting control according to their own methods, all of them motivated 
by their own governing aims, which “steered” and “rowed” the ship of 
the electricity grid. It is this decentralized, nodal history of grid 
governance that can provide the blueprint for how to understand the 
governance of the electricity grid today. 
C. The Topography of the Modern U.S. Electricity Grid 
This revised grid history suggests that a better understanding of 
grid governance requires a comprehensive analysis of all of the 
potential nodes and pathways that influence events on the grid. Such 
an analysis produces a decentralized network topography that 
describes and directs grid governance. This mapping reveals that 
 
 113.  Id. at 67, 69. 
 114.  For instance: the regional coordinating councils and the formation of the National 
Electric Reliability Council (“NERC”), see COHN, supra note 82, at 145, 167–70, 201; the long-
term bilateral contracts that were prohibited during California’s restructuring period and helped 
plunge the state into rolling blackouts, see SWEENEY, supra note 62, at 64–66, 74; and the TVA 
and its “grassroots” approach to electrifying the rural South, see SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 94; 
see supra note 41 and accompanying citations. 
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electricity governance should not be conceived of as a command-or-
control model, or a neoliberal one, but rather as a densely populated, 
constantly evolving network of decentralized actors—one that has 
grown more complex (with more nodes and networks introduced) over 
time. This network is illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 is the visual representation of modern grid governance 
under the decentralized model. All of the main players and paths of 
power are included. Some are familiar from the history of the grid 
recounted above; others are new entrants that have cropped up in the 
last decade. Similar network relationships and means of influence have 
been highlighted with colored arrows. This Part discusses these 
relationships. For those interested in influencing grid events—for 
instance, environmentalists looking to decarbonize the grid—each 
relationship represents an opportunity to assert influence, some with 
more likelihood of success than others. 
1. Economic Competition 
The red arrows represent a standard market-based or competitive 
economic relationship. This relationship most often describes the 
dynamic between buyers and sellers on the electricity grid. 
Take sellers of electricity. Historically, this category was 
dominated by the private investor-owned utility, which controlled 
three-quarters of wholesale electricity sales in the country.115 Today, 
after the reforms of the 1990s, private investor-owned utilities are 
responsible for only one-tenth of total wholesale sales.116 The vast 
majority of wholesale electricity sales (around 40%) have shifted to 
merchant generators—owners and operators of natural gas plants, 
nuclear power stations, hydropower and wind turbines, solar fields, and 
coal plants—that operate outside of the utility structure.117 These 
entities are the “Merchant Generator” nodes that appear in Figure 4. 
Merchant generators sell their electricity in the wholesale markets 
(labeled “Regional Wholesale Markets” in Figure 4), competing 
alongside each other and other generation resources to offer the 
lowest-cost electricity. Competitors can include leftover private utility 
assets (the “Private Utility” node in Figure 4), federally owned 
 
 115.  BAKKE, supra note 24, at 69–70. 
 116.  This information comes from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Form EIA-
861 data file on “Operational Data.” See Electric Power Sales, Revenue, and Energy Efficiency 
Form EIA-861 Detailed Data Files, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ [hereinafter Form EIA-861]. “Retail Sales” and 
“wholesale sales” are taken from the EIA’s Disposition data on “Retail Sales” and “Sales for 
Resale” in the same data file. Id. The EIA data aggregates electricity sales from eleven categories 
of utilities, classified according to ownership: federal, cooperative, investor-owned, municipal, 
municipal marketing authorities, political subdivisions, retail power marketers, states, 
transmission, and “unknown” (a category that includes five community choice aggregators in 
California). Id. The final category of ownership, “Behind the Meter,” was excluded in these 
calculations and in the retail and wholesale sales percentages discussed in the paragraphs below. 
 117.  See id. 
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generation assets—like the four federal power marketing 
administrations (PMAs) that generate electricity predominantly from 
hydroelectric dams (labeled “Federal PMA” in Figure 4),118 or the New 
Deal–era TVA119—as well as local generation owned or operated by 
states, municipal utilities, public utility districts, or cooperative utilities 
(represented by the “Municipal Utility” node).120 
A new form of competitor has also recently been appearing in the 
wholesale markets: the “distributed energy resource” (labeled 
“Distributed Energy Resource” in Figure 4). This umbrella term 
represents a variety of small-scale, customer-side generation assets—
often residential solar panels, cogeneration plants, or electric vehicles 
or other battery storage technologies—that can either be used to fuel 
a single household or, alternatively, aggregated together across 
thousands of households to form one large “power plant” that can bid 
into the wholesale marketplace.121 Depending on the jurisdiction, 
distributed energy resources can also include demand response or 
energy efficiency programs, which pay groups of customers to reduce 
their energy usage.122 Distributed energy resources are relatively new 
 
 118.  Id.; see generally Federal Power Marketing Administrations Operate Across Much of the 
United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 12, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.php?id=11651. 
 119.  SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 94; TVA At a Glance, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., 
https://www.tva.gov/About-TVA/TVA-at-a-Glance (last visited Mar. 28, 2018). 
 120.  For instance, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) reports that in 2016, 
eighteen municipal marketing authorities—nonprofit organizations that are created by the 
residents of a municipality in order to create a public-private electricity partnership—accounted 
for around 2% of total wholesale sales. See Form EIA-861, supra note 116, “Operational Data.” 
More than one hundred public utility districts—which are “voted into existence by a majority of 
the residents of any given area for the specific purpose of providing utility service to the voters,” 
and which are independent of city councils or governments, see id., “861 2017 Instructions”—were 
responsible for almost 3.5% of total wholesale sales, see id., “Operational Data.” Eighteen state-
owned utilities, including entities like the California Department of Water Resources and the 
New York Power Authority, provided around 2.3% of total wholesale sales of electricity. Id. And 
cooperative utilities (a quasi-public, quasi-private form of nonprofit entities that are member-
owned and -governed, often by rural communities or other community groups who were not being 
adequately served by private investor-owned utilities, JIM LAZAR, THE REGULATORY 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE U.S.: A GUIDE 10 (2011)), accounted 
for almost 12% of total wholesale sales of electricity in 2016. See Form EIA-861, supra note 116, 
“Operational Data.” 
 121.  See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES: TECHNICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE BULK POWER SYSTEM: STAFF REPORT 5–10 (2018) (overview of 
distributed energy resource technologies and definitions). 
 122.  Id. at 7–8. 
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assets in the wholesale markets,123 but they have the potential to disrupt 
standard wholesale market operation by allowing decentralized, small-
scale resources to compete against more traditional large-scale power 
plants. 
Sellers who do not participate in the wholesale markets are 
nonetheless also motivated by economic considerations. Such sellers 
often negotiate bilateral contracts directly with electricity buyers. 
Bilateral contracts can be good options for buyers to hedge against 
price volatility and ensure a long-term electricity supply; they are also 
popular in those regions of the U.S. that did not transition to FERC’s 
regional wholesale market model.124 
The economic forces guiding both in– and out-of-market 
purchases can also have a profound effect on events occurring on the 
electricity grid. Over the last decade, for instance, the grid has seen a 
dramatic shift away from higher-priced coal and nuclear power plants 
towards lower-cost natural gas and renewable (i.e., wind and solar) 
plants.125 Although market dynamics are not the only factor influencing 
generation trends, fuel costs have been a crucial driver of this shift.126 
 
 123.  The California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”), the market operator 
responsible for overseeing California’s wholesale markets, has allowed distributed energy 
resources to participate in the wholesale markets since 2016. California Independent System 
Operator, 155 FERC ¶ 61,229 (2016). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), 
the federal agency responsible for setting rules for most of the wholesale markets in the country—
California is one such market, but FERC oversees six others in the United States, OFFICE OF 
ELECTRICITY DELIVERY AND ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, UNITED STATES 
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY PRIMER 26 (2015) [hereinafter U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
PRIMER]—was expected to issue its own rules requiring distributed energy resource participation 
in wholesale markets across the country, but has postponed that rulemaking for more factfinding. 
Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and 
Independent System Operators, Order No. 841, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127, at *4 (Feb. 15, 2018) 
[hereinafter Order 841]. However, FERC has taken a piecemeal approach to distributed energy 
resources, requiring wholesale market operators to accommodate specific distributed resources 
like energy storage resources, id. at *3, and demand response programs, Demand Response 
Competition in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658 (Mar. 
24, 2011) [hereinafter Order 745]. 
 124.  Most of the Southeastern and Western United States (except California) operates 
without a regional wholesale market. See U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY PRIMER, supra note 123, 
at 25–26. 
 125.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018, at 83 (2018). In 2010, 
coal was the dominant fuel source for electricity generation in the United States; today, natural 
gas comes out ahead, with renewables falling close behind. Id. 
 126.  Id. at 84 (“Fuel prices in the near term drive the share of natural gas-fired and coal-fired 
generation.”); see also id. at 88 (“Coal-fired generation capacity decreases by an additional 65 
GW between 2017 and 2030 [under EIA projection scenarios] as a result of competitively priced 
natural gas and increasing renewables generation . . . . Higher natural gas prices . . . slow the pace 
of coal power plant retirements . . . . Conversely, lower natural gas prices . . . increase coal power 
plant retirements . . . .”). 
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2. Direct Self-Governance 
The green arrows represent opportunities for direct self-
governance. There are a number of autonomous entities on the grid 
that, unlike private utilities, are run by consumers for themselves. As a 
result, these entities are often governed by a wider variety of concerns 
than just the cost of electricity, such as environmental impact, self-
sufficiency, reliability, and trendiness. 
For instance, municipal utilities, public utility districts, municipal 
marketing authorities, and cooperative utilities are all owned or 
managed to some degree by the residents of the communities they 
serve.127 Because these utilities are all public entities or not-for-profits, 
and are often exempted from state and federal regulations,128 they can 
prioritize their electricity purchases according to their members’ non-
economic preferences. For example, responding to member interest in 
renewable energy, public utilities and cooperatives have driven 
innovative energy projects like large-scale community solar plants.129 
And cities like Georgetown, Texas130 and Boulder, Colorado131 are 
using their municipal utilities to achieve residents’ demands for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
Similarly, communities interested in self-run utilities but 
dissuaded by the legal hurdles involved in forming them can turn to 
Community Choice Aggregations (CCAs) (labeled as such in Figure 
4). CCAs are stripped-down versions of municipal utilities that employ 
private utilities for the maintenance of distribution lines, transmission 
 
 127.  See generally DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 121. 
 128.  See PHILIPSON & WILLIS, supra note 44, at 37. 
 129.  See Herman K. Trabish, Utilities Take Note: Next Generation Utility-Led Community 
Solar is Emerging, UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/utilities-take-
note-next-generation-utility-led-community-solar-is-emergin/507289/; Thomas Gulley, Rural Co-
Ops and Public Utilities Have Voluntarily Built Nearly 100MW of Community Solar. Here’s Why, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/rural-
coops-and-public-utilities-have-built-nearly-100mw-of-community-solar#gs.GOUa96A. 
 130.  Georgetown Utility to be Powered by Solar and Wind Energy by 2017, GEORGETOWN 
(Mar. 18, 2015), https://georgetown.org/2015/03/18/georgetown-utility-to-be-powered-by-solar-
and-wind-energy-by-2017/. 
 131.  Alex Burness, Boulder’s Muni Lives as Voters Reaffirm Support for Local Electric 
Utility, DAILY CAMERA (Nov. 7, 2017, 7:26 PM), http://www.dailycamera.com/boulder-election-
news/ci_31437049/boulder-municipalization-tax; Mark Jaffe, Boulder Wanted Its Own Electric 
Utility. Does It Still?, DENVER POST (Oct. 27, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/ 
2017/10/27/boulder-wanted-its-own-electric-utility-does-it-still/. 
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lines, and billing systems, but still allow communities to manage their 
own electricity contracts, build and run their own generation assets, 
and develop distributed energy resource programs.132 CCAs are 
relatively new and are only authorized in a few states.133 Nonetheless, 
they have already become an explosive force in retail electricity sales. 
In California, for instance, five CCAs alone served almost a million 
customers by the end of 2017.134 And, like their public utility 
counterparts, CCAs are often formed to serve communities’ clean 
energy goals.135 
Self-supply of electricity is also popular. In the corporate world, 
large industrial or commercial customers may elect to build their own 
generation sources, contract with independent generators, or purchase 
credits that support energy development elsewhere. Recently, 
corporations have been particularly active in the renewables markets, 
buying up a record number of long-term renewable energy contracts 
and energy credits136 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, meet 
sustainability goals, save money, and limit exposure to price 
volatility.137 
Finally, individual households may also engage in electricity self-
governance. Depending on their own preferences—e.g., status or 
brand loyalty, environmental concerns, energy independence, or 
expense—residents can buy rooftop solar panels, energy efficient 
appliances, smart thermostats, electric vehicles, battery storage, and 
small-scale cogeneration facilities for their home.138 
All told, these self-governing entities may eventually overtake 
private investor-owned utilities’ retail dominance. In fact, according to 
the California PUC, more than 85% of California customers are 
predicted to be served by sources other than private investor-owned 
 
 132.  Welton, supra note 15, at 308. 
 133.  See CCA by State, LOCAL ENERGY AGGREGATION NETWORK (last updated Apr. 2018), 
http://www.leanenergyus.org/cca-by-state/. 
 134.  Herman K. Trabish, Join or Die: How Utilities Are Coping with 100% Renewable Energy 
Goals, UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/join-or-die-how-utilities-
are-coping-with-100-renewable-energy-goals/512664/. 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  Corporations Purchased Record Amounts of Clean Power in 2017, BLOOMBERG NEF 
(Jan. 22, 2018), https://about.bnef.com/blog/corporations-purchased-record-amounts-of-clean-
power-in-2017/0. 
 137.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CORPORATE RENEWABLE ENERGY PROCUREMENT 
SURVEY INSIGHTS 2 (2016). 
 138.  In 2017, distributed generation installations amounted to an estimated 30,000 MW. FED. 
ENERGY REG. COMM’N, supra note 121, at 7 fig.2. The number of annual installations is expected 
to double by 2024. Id. 
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utilities in less than a decade—the inverse of the state’s retail 
consumption today.139 If that trend holds true for the rest of the 
country, the number of nodes connected by green arrows on the grid 
could multiply. Accordingly, electricity customers’ individual 
preferences could increasingly influence electricity purchase decisions. 
3. Indirect Self-Governance 
The purple arrows represent opportunities for indirect self-
governance. In this relationship, while a node may not directly dictate 
the governing choices of another node on the grid, it can do so by 
proxy. 
For instance, consumers and state PUCs have an indirect self-
governing relationship. While individual consumers are not directly 
responsible for the governing choices made by PUCs, as public 
agencies, these commissions are ultimately accountable to voters. That 
means that consumers unhappy with how their electricity grid is being 
governed may participate in public proceedings conducted by the 
commission, contact their commissioners, contact their state 
representatives (who appoint the commissioners), or ultimately vote 
for new representation in the state legislature. 
Similarly, aggregated distributed energy resources represent an 
opportunity for indirect self-governance. Individual consumers with 
rooftop solar, energy efficient appliances, electric vehicles, or battery 
storage may use those resources to govern their own electricity 
consumption directly. But they can also lend out those resources to a 
third-party aggregator, who can indirectly bid those collective 
resources into the wholesale markets. That aggregation allows the 
choices of individual consumers to have a much larger effect on grid 
governance. 
4. Top-Down Regulation 
The blue arrows represent a top-down regulatory relationship. As 
recounted in the grid history above, there are two general levels at 
which this happens: the state and federal level. The federal regulator 
node in Figure 4 is labeled “FERC,” while the state node is labeled 
“State PUC.” The electricity grid also has several quasi-public, quasi-
 
 139.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 18, at 3. 
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private regional bodies that behave similarly to regulatory agencies, 
including the regional wholesale markets. These bodies connect to 
other entities via the blue arrows as well. 
To begin at the state level: state nodes generally take the form of 
PUCs. Because state retail competition efforts haphazardly collapsed 
in the early 2000s, the PUCs perform different functions depending on 
the state. In approximately fifteen states and the District of Columbia, 
the PUCs supervise a competitive retail choice model, under which 
customers can select their electricity provider with relative freedom 
(signified by the pink arrow connecting the “Residential Consumer” 
node to the “Private Utility” node).140 In seven states, retail choice 
options have been suspended or rescinded, leaving a split between 
regulated monopoly utilities and competitive retail options (signified 
by the tan double-lined arrow connecting the “Consumer” node to the 
“Private Utility” node).141 The remaining states function solely under a 
regulated monopoly model (signified by the yellow arrow connecting 
the “Consumer” node to the “Private Utility” node). 
Through top-down regulation of private utilities, PUCs wield 
enormous influence over the composition of the electricity grid. For 
instance, PUCs often subsidize preferred forms of merchant 
generation by requiring utilities to purchase electricity from specific 
sources.142 Or, PUCs may direct utilities to achieve an energy savings 
target each year. PUCs can also use their power over utilities to bring 
new technologies onto the grid: for example, several states have 
implemented energy storage mandates that require utilities to procure 
a set quantity of battery storage,143 while others have used utility rate-
 
 140.  These states include Oregon, Texas, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
and Maine; Oregon and Michigan both only offer partial retail choice. See MATTHEW J. MOREY 
& LAURENCE D. KIRSH, ELECTRIC MARKETS RESEARCH FOUNDATION, RETAIL CHOICE IN 
ELECTRICITY: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED IN 20 YEARS? 4, fig.1 (2016); JOHANNES 
PFEIFENBERGER, THE BRATTLE GROUP, ELECTRICITY MARKET RESTRUCTURING: WHERE 
ARE WE NOW? 9 (2016). 
 141.  Those states are California, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, Montana, Arkansas, and 
Virginia. See MOREY & KIRSH, supra note 140, at 3; PFEIFENBERGER, supra note 140. 
 142.  Renewable Portfolio Standards are the most common of these policies. As of 2017, 
twenty-nine states have adopted an RPS. Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG. (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx. 
 143.  The most prominent examples of these include California’s mandate to its electric 
utilities to procure 1300 MW of energy storage by 2020, Energy Storage, CAL. PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMM’N (last visited Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=3462, and New 
York’s mandate to procure 1500 MW of energy storage by 2025, Energy Storage in New York, 
NYSERDA (last visited July 16, 2018), https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All%20Programs/Programs/ 
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setting mechanisms to encourage investments in carbon capture and 
sequestration technologies.144 These command-and-control techniques 
allow expensive technologies to build up economies of scale until they 
can compete in the wholesale markets—an example of a blue arrow 
transitioning to a red one. 
State PUCs also influence events on the grid through various 
licensing, rate-setting, and incentive programs that are directed at non-
utility entities. For instance, state programs like net metering—a 
method of rate-setting that allows owners of residential solar panels to 
sell their excess electricity back onto the grid—can be the deciding 
factor for whether distributed energy resources like rooftop solar are 
economically viable.145 Similarly, state laws regarding energy 
efficiency, demand response, battery storage, and other technologies 
often dictate whether and how these resources can be aggregated to 
bid into the wholesale markets. And innovative forms of retail-side 
electricity governance, like CCAs, often require permission under state 
law before they can be constituted. In fact, if the role of private utilities 
diminishes in the future, state governance of unconventional electricity 
sellers may become the key mechanism through which PUCs assert 
control on the grid. 
Moving on to the federal level: the primary federal node on the 
grid, FERC, also uses top-down regulatory powers to dictate outcomes 
on the electricity grid. FERC is charged with regulating wholesale sales 
of electricity that occur across state lines, transmission, and several 
other interstate electricity transactions.146 FERC exercises this power 
through direct regulation of merchant generators, private utilities, and 
distributed energy resources, as well as indirect regulation of these 
entities via the regional wholesale markets. 
FERC’s most important exercise of its top-down authority comes 
in the form of rules regarding the operation of the regional wholesale 
markets. As the number and type of electricity sellers and buyers has 




 144.  See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 851–52 (describing Mississippi’s subsidies for a 
clean-coal plant through favorable electricity rate treatment). 
 145.  See id. at 862–63, 863 n.220. 
 146.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824a–w. 
19. Gocke_ME Clean (Do Not Delete) 4/25/2019  12:42 PM 
Spring 2019] NODAL GOVERNANCE  243 
significance. That is, only several decades ago, the wholesale markets 
were populated primarily by fossil fuel and nuclear plants. Now, FERC 
is deciding whether and how to introduce new resources—like demand 
response, renewable energy, battery storage, and distributed energy 
resources147—into the marketplace. For instance, in 2011, FERC issued 
a rule requiring market operators to allow demand response programs 
to bid into the wholesale markets.148 More importantly, FERC directed 
market operators to compensate demand response programs—which 
are in essence promises to reduce rather than generate electricity—at a 
rate equal to the clearing price for electricity.149 This rule gave 
electricity savings the opportunity to compete on equal footing with 
electricity generation in the wholesale market. Similar rules were 
adopted in 2018 for energy storage.150 
Moreover, FERC is not the only entity to use its regulatory 
authority to influence the power flows in the marketplace. In many 
cases, the regional market operators do not wait for FERC’s dictates; 
they set market rules on their own and receive FERC’s approval at the 
tail end of the process. In Figure 4, the “Regional Wholesale Market” 
nodes thus have their own blue arrows linking to the “Merchant 
Generator,” “Distributed Energy Resource,” “Private Utility,” 
“Community Choice Aggregation,” and “Municipal Utility” nodes—
arrows representing their own regulatory power functionally (if not 
formally) distinct from that of FERC. 
There are nine RTOs that oversee the grid’s transmission lines.151 
These regional market operators are tasked with running transmission 
in a nondiscriminatory manner.152 They determine who can participate 
in the markets, set the clearing price for electricity, and dispatch 
electricity to meet demand. They also manage congestion on the 
 
 147.  See supra Part II.C.1 for a definition of these resources. 
 148.  See Order 745, supra note 123. 
 149.  See C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(v)(A). 
 150.  Order 841, supra note 123, at *3–4. 
 151.  Technically, these RTOs are properly broken down into “RTOs” and “ISOs.” RTOs 
and ISOs are functionally very similar, except that ISOs (which preceded FERC’s orders creating 
RTOs) either may not meet the four minimum characteristics and eight minimum functions 
required for RTOs, or the ISO may not have petitioned FERC for RTO status. U.S. ELECTRICITY 
INDUSTRY PRIMER, supra note 123, at 25–26 (2015); see also 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(j)(1)–(4). For 
simplicity’s sake, I refer to them all as “RTOs” here. 
 152.  See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 88, at 551–52. The open access rule stems from 
the following FERC Orders: Order 888, supra note 53; Order 889, supra note 54; Preventing 
Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & 
Regs. ¶ 31,096 (2007), 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266 (2007) [hereinafter Order 890]; and Order 2000, supra 
note 57. 
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transmission lines, ensure adequate long-term generation resources, 
and provide a variety of ancillary services that support the grid.153 
Coincident with their origin as voluntary power pools, the market 
operators have acquired an unusual structure. They are private entities 
that come into existence by the voluntary agreement of regional 
stakeholders.154 They are run by corporate-like boards of directors155 
who cannot have financial interests in the transmission, generation, or 
distribution assets that they oversee.156 FERC created these operators 
to encourage greater competition within the electricity markets but, in 
the process, essentially granted the RTOs a monopoly over the 
dispatch and transmission of electricity.157 
5. Collaboration & Negotiation 
The orange arrows represent opportunities for collaboration and 
negotiation between regulatory nodes on the grid. In most cases, this 
occurs where a pathway for top-down, command-and-control 
regulation exists, but the parties have opted for a more collaborative 
relationship. 
Take the orange arrow connecting the “Regional Wholesale 
Markets” node to the “FERC” node in Figure 4. Technically, FERC 
has the power to dictate how the market operators run the wholesale 
markets. In reality, the process tends to contain much more back-and-
forth: market operators develop rules for market management, submit 
those rules to FERC for input, and then refine their policies based on 
FERC’s response. In some cases, market operators may even originate 
a rule and test it out in their jurisdiction, with FERC later making that 
policy (once proven successful) mandatory across all of the wholesale 
markets. In fact, that is exactly what happened in the case of energy 
 
 153.  FERC specified the ancillary services RTOs are responsible for providing in Order No. 
888. See Order 888, supra note 53. 
 154.  Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 88, at 556. 
 155.  These boards can include representatives from state regulatory agencies, public 
consumer advocacy organizations, public and private utilities, independent power producers and 
other merchant generators, environmental groups, and transmission operators. For an overview 
of the stakeholder board composition of the nine RTOs/ISOs, see CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 
TABLE OF STAKEHOLDER COMMITTEES OF OTHER ISOS AND RTOS (2014), 
https://www.caiso.com/Documents/ISO-RTO_CommitteeStructures-Oct2014.pdf. 
 156.  Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 88, at 553. 
 157.  Id. at 555. 
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storage: California’s wholesale market operator developed a 
mechanism for incorporating energy storage into its wholesale 
markets, the policy was tested out in California’s market for several 
years, and just in 2018 FERC issued a rule requiring all wholesale 
market operators to include energy storage within their markets.158 
State PUCs also have the opportunity to collaborate and negotiate 
with the regional and federal nodes on the grid, as indicated by the 
orange arrows connecting these nodes in Figure 4. First, states often 
include representatives from their PUCs on the market operators’ 
stakeholder governance board; in fact, in some regional markets, state 
representatives can even approve market rules prior to their 
enactment.159 Second, some state PUCs work closely with market 
operators to align their policy preferences. Again, California provides 
the best example of this: the California wholesale market operator has 
collaborated with the California PUC to integrate renewable energy 
and distributed energy resources into the grid, often by jointly planning 
price mechanisms, transmission infrastructure, and capacity 
requirements.160 
6. Lobbying 
The black dotted arrows represent opportunities for lobbying or 
political influence. The relationship is similar to that indicated by the 
orange arrows, but highlights the informal influence wielded by private 
entities instead of public ones. Most often, this includes private utilities 
or merchant generators lobbying state PUCs, the regional market 
operators, or FERC in order to give themselves a competitive 
advantage. 
Private utilities are particularly adept at convincing state PUCs 
and FERC to subsidize expensive infrastructure investments with 
uncertain futures and to deter competition from new forms of energy 
resources. For instance, in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, 
lobbying by the utility companies led the states’ PUCs to allow the 
utilities to recover the costs of the construction of floundering nuclear 
and clean coal projects before the projects were even online.161  
 
 158.  See Order 745, supra note 123, and accompanying citations. 
 159.  See supra note 155 and accompanying citations. 
 160.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 161.  See Tony Bartelme, Power Failure: How Utilities Across the U.S. Changed the Rules to 
Make Big Bets With Your Money, POST & COURIER (Dec. 10, 2017), 
https://www.postandcourier.com/news/power-failure-how-utilities-across-the-u-s-changed-the/ 
article_434e8778-c880-11e7-9691-e7b11f5b3381.html. 
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In Arizona, aggressive lobbying by the utility companies had the 
state remove its net metering program for rooftop solar technologies, 
thereby also removing one of the utility’s prime competitors.162 At the 
federal level, as FERC contemplates rules for allowing distributed 
energy resources to compete in the wholesale markets, utilities have 
been jockeying to be given the final say on whether those resources can 
bid into the marketplace, a position that would essentially allow 
utilities to decide the economic future of their competition.163 
Merchant generators also lobby state and federal regulators. For 
instance, owners of nuclear power plants, which have suffered in recent 
years due to low natural gas and renewable energy prices, have 
appealed to the states to subsidize their generation. They achieved 
some success in New York, Illinois, Connecticut, and New Jersey (with 
efforts currently stalled in Ohio and Pennsylvania).164 Coal plant 
owners are similarly pushing both the states and the federal 
government for support.  
Under the Trump Administration, coal plants have even pushed 
FERC and the DOE to use various “emergency” powers to provide 
financial support to struggling plants.165 Some of these efforts can 
 
 162.  See Julia Pyper, Arizona Vote Puts an End to Net Metering for Solar Customers, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/arizona-
vote-puts-an-end-to-net-metering-for-solar-customers#gs.2UoScnI. 
 163.  Utilities assert that this power is needed in order to prevent potential threats to the 
operation of the distribution lines. See Gavin Bade, Utilities, DER Providers Face Off Over 
Market Access at FERC Meeting, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/ 
news/utilities-der-providers-face-off-over-market-access-at-ferc-meeting/521197/. 
 164.  See generally Peter Maloney, Exelon, FE Nuke Closures Would Reverse PJM Wind, 
Solar Benefits: Brattle Report, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/ 
news/exelon-fe-nuke-closures-would-reverse-pjm-wind-solar-benefits-brattle-re/521468/; Gavin 
Bade, New Jersey Passes Bills for Nuke Subsidies, 50% RPS, 2 GW Storage Target, UTILITY DIVE 
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-jersey-passes-bills-for-nuke-subsidies-50-
rps-2-gw-storage-target/521314/; Robert Walton, Dominion Threatens Millstone Closure if Plant 
Shut Out of Support Program, UTILITY DIVE (July 10, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/ 
news/dominion-threatens-millstone-closure-if-plant-shut-out-of-support-program/527364/; 
Robert Walton, AEP Supports FirstEnergy Push for Zero-Emission Nuclear Credits in Ohio, 
UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/aep-supports-firstenergy-push-
for-zero-emission-nuclear-credits-in-ohio/437734/. 
 165.  Brad Plumer, Trump Orders a Lifeline for Struggling Coal and Nuclear Plants, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/climate/trump-coal-nuclear-
power.html; Robert Walton & Gavin Bade, FirstEnergy Asks DOE for Emergency Action to Save 
PJM Coal, Nuke Plants, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ 
firstenergy-asks-doe-for-emergency-action-to-save-pjm-coal-nuke-plants/520280/. 
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translate into reconfigurations of grid governance that threaten the 
existence of other nodes on the grid. 
*** 
The nodes and networks described above dictate how our 
electricity grid functions. They set its priorities and control its 
outcomes. Some nodes are more powerful than others, exercising 
control over larger swaths of the electricity grid. Some are wealthier 
than others. Some are more populous. Some have more paths for 
influence than others, and some maintain networks that are innately 
more powerful. Each of these players influences how our grid is run to 
some degree, and changes in the number or type or role of nodes and 
networks inevitably change the nature of our electricity grid. 
III. THE BENEFITS OF A NODAL ELECTRICITY GRID 
The nodal grid presented in Part II is not only descriptively 
accurate, but also useful as a guide for solving grid governance 
problems. First, the nodal topography of the grid reveals the potential 
benefits that flow from having a diversity of nodes and networks—
benefits that we often associate with other forms of decentralized 
governance. And second, these overlooked actors can offer solutions 
to policy issues that, thus far, a top-down approach has been unable to 
solve. For instance, California’s proposal to regionalize its electricity 
grid has faced pushback because of concerns about who would govern 
the regional grid in a top-down manner. Federal action to decarbonize 
the electricity grid has been conspicuously absent for decades, at least 
in part because of fears of a top-down federal carbon tax or cap-and-
trade program. A nodal governance approach suggests a way to move 
beyond these debates by empowering unconventional nodes on the 
grid and leveraging the grid’s nodal benefits to achieve certain policy 
outcomes. Indeed, the Green New Deal—a recent proposal to, in part, 
decarbonize the electricity grid—looks a lot like what one might expect 
under a nodal governance framework. 
This is not to say that there are not downsides that come with the 
nodal grid. The nodal grid raises obvious concerns about inefficiency, 
unequal distribution of power, inertia, and a lack of systemwide 
thinking. It would be useful, in another paper, to think about ways to 
mitigate some of these concerns while still maintaining the benefits. 
But for now, this article focuses on sketching out some of the upsides 
of a nodal network approach, particularly because they are not 
immediately obvious. 
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A. The Governance Benefits of a Nodal Grid 
Many of the governance benefits that come from a nodal 
electricity grid are akin to those found in decentralized governing 
systems.166 For instance, scholars often extoll the benefits 
decentralization offers in the form of preference maximization; 
competition and the minimization of externalities; policy 
experimentation; local governance; and minority rule and dissent.167  
This section provides an overview of how some of these conventional 
benefits apply to the U.S. electricity grid. The overview is not meant to 
be exhaustive or in-depth, but it does provide a useful framework for 
thinking about why the complex nodal network described in Part II is 
preferable to a more streamlined, top-down system. 
1. Maximizing Preferences 
One of the most commonly cited benefits of decentralized 
governance is that it allows citizens to maximize their preferences. 
Imagine a single, centralized governing body choosing between two 
options based on majority rule. The option with the greatest total 
support wins. Then imagine if that same governing body is split up into 
smaller units, with each unit capable of selecting its own option. 
Assuming that the preferences are distributed unevenly amongst the 
smaller sites, with some units favoring the “majority” option and others 
the “minority,” overall utility is maximized in the decentralized system 
rather than the centralized one.168 
 
 
 166.  That is not to say that a nodal governance system is the exact same as any other 
decentralized system. Under nodal governance theory, the nodes and networks can be fluid, 
unstable, and multi-layered. By contrast, more conventional decentralized systems, e.g., the 
American federalist system, have relatively static boundaries for their governing bodies and 
governing mechanisms.  Nonetheless, many of the same benefits that we see in decentralized 
systems—which we often associate with democratic governance—are equally applicable to nodal 
electricity governance. 
 167.  Many of these benefits are discussed in the context of federalism. For just a tip of the 
iceberg, see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, ‘A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers’: In 
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 774–79 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 525–30 (1995); Barry Friedman, Valuing 
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 318–20, 387–404 (1997); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: 
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2010); Larry Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1994); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating 
the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491–1511 (1987). 
 168.   See McConnell, supra note 167, at 1494. 
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A decentralized grid similarly offers greater likelihood that 
individual consumers will be able to maximize their electricity 
preferences. Imagine a single, top-down electricity grid: one form of 
grid governance would predominate based on majority preference. 
Then picture a nodal grid (in its idealized form): consumers interested 
in actively managing their electricity consumption can choose to 
participate in municipal utilities, cooperatives, CCAs, or similar self-
governed nodes. They can supply their own electricity through 
distributed energy resources, energy efficient appliances, smart-home 
devices, and (if they are large commercial or industrial consumers) 
direct contracts with generators. Within each of these nodes, 
consumers can then select the electricity generation choices that satisfy 
their priorities such as sustainability, cost, local job provision, etc. 
Alternatively, if consumers prefer to leave their electricity 
consumption choices to others, they can purchase electricity from a 
private utility and cede governing control in return for less hassle. 
More choices are available on the nodal grid than the centralized one. 
For instance, in regional wholesale markets, the nine market 
operators have created very different market dynamics depending on 
their stakeholder preferences. The California wholesale market 
operator has been active in incorporating distributed energy resources 
into the grid,169 building transmission infrastructure that supports 
higher renewable energy resource penetration,170 and designing a 
“greenhouse gas emissions bidder” that puts a price on carbon for all 
resources bidding into the California wholesale market,171 which is 
essentially a carbon tax for the electricity sector. Meanwhile, the 
eastern states’ market operators have adopted rules that favor more 
traditional fossil fuel and nuclear power plants, citing concerns over 
reliability and the intermittent generation that comes with wind and 
solar resources.172 
 
 169.  California’s wholesale market operator is the first (and as of right now, the only) market 
operator to allow distributed energy resources to participate at the wholesale level. California 
Independent System Operator, 155 FERC ¶ 61,229 (2016). 
 170.  See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 2017-2018 TRANSMISSION PLAN 19–28 (2018). 
 171.  See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, EIM GREENHOUSE GAS ENHANCEMENT: DRAFT 
FINAL PROPOSAL 6 (2017). 
 172.  See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 151 FERC ¶ 61,208 (2015) (adopting capacity 
market rules that disfavor renewable generation out of an expressed concern for reliability); 
Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 860 F.3d 656, 661–62 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) (upholding the rules as not arbitrary or capricious). 
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2. Competition and Minimization of Externalities 
Decentralized governing systems also offer the opportunity for 
competition and the minimization of externalities. Competition 
operates horizontally: the existence of multiple different nodes across 
the same level of governance allows those nodes to compete with each 
other on the basis of governance outcomes, with the hope that 
government becomes “more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry.”173 Minimization of externalities 
operates vertically: the governing node that is best able to internalize 
both the costs and benefits of a given policy exercises jurisdiction over 
those policies, with smaller nodes responsible for local issues and larger 
ones tasked with overseeing national priorities.174 That way, each node 
oversees policies that either benefit or burden its constituency equally. 
The same holds true for the nodal electricity grid. A diverse range 
of utility models (e.g., public, private, rural cooperative, CCA, etc.), 
generation and conservation nodes (which compete economically with 
each other in the regional wholesale markets), and state regulatory and 
ratemaking regimes encourages horizontal competition. Consumers or 
generators who are unhappy with their existing nodes can switch to 
different jurisdictions or different generation sources, with the hope 
that the “best” node outcompetes its rivals. CCAs are a perfect 
example of this: the demand for self-governed municipal utility nodes 
was high, but the legal hurdles required to form such nodes dissuaded 
consumers from selecting them. So, CCAs were developed, which 
offered many of the same benefits as municipal utilities without the 
same regulatory costs. Horizontal competition between different utility 
models thus leads to the creation of a new governing node that fits 
consumers’ demand. 
Meanwhile, externality minimization operates through FERC and 
the regional wholesale markets. If the electricity grid consisted of only 
local governing nodes, the costs and benefits of electricity generation 
 
 173.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see generally THOMAS R. DYE, 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); Friedman, supra note 
167, at 387. 
 174.  For instance, McConnell explains how the existence of externalities argues for national 
defense and water pollution regulation and treatment decisions to occur at the national, rather 
than local, level. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1495. But see Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, 
The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 78–98 (2014) (arguing 
that “spillovers” between states is a feature, not a bug, and therefore may not require correction). 
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would be borne by small, localized groups of consumers. But that may 
be an inherently inefficient system if the benefits and the costs of 
electricity generation could be distributed over a larger consumer base. 
FERC and the regional wholesale markets—governing nodes that 
capture a larger swath of the population—reduce exactly this 
inefficiency. For instance, by allowing generators to compete across 
regional marketplaces, the wholesale markets distribute the costs of 
generation across a larger population. The wholesale markets also 
allocate the costs of transmission lines and security, resiliency, and 
reliability standards throughout the region. Additionally, if the 
wholesale market has a greenhouse gas “bid adder” (as the California 
market does), the environmental costs of generation can be borne by 
the region as well. 
3. Policy Experimentation 
Decentralization is also associated with policy experimentation—
Justice Brandeis’s “laboratories of democracy.” According to 
Brandeis, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that 
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”175 Decentralized governing units provide 
opportunities for citizens to develop tailored solutions to local 
problems, invest in and refine those solutions at a small scale, and then 
enumerate “best practices” for similar problems occurring in other 
jurisdictions or at a national level.176 
Likewise, the nodal grid allows experimentation in grid 
technologies and management techniques. For example, California’s 
enthusiasm for solar energy led it to support solar technologies through 
tax benefits, net metering, solar mandates, rebate programs, and 
creative third-party ownership models. These policies reduced the cost 
of solar technologies, spurred innovation in the field, and enabled solar 
to spread to other states.177 A similar story could be told for wind 
 
 175.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 176.  See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 339–418 (1998) (analogizing the private sector’s 
approach to best practices management to the American bureaucracy initiated under the New 
Deal). 
 177.  See, e.g., Easan Drury et al., The Transformation of Southern California’s Residential 
Photovoltaics Market Through Third-Party Ownership, 42 ENERGY POL’Y 681, 689 (2012) 
(attributing solar growth to state-supported third-party ownership schemes); Jonathan E. Hughes 
& Molly Podolefsky, Getting Green with Solar Subsidies: Evidence from the California Solar 
Initiative, 2 J. ASS’N ENV’TL & RES. ECON. 235 (2015) (finding that California’s Solar Initiative 
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technologies promoted by states in the West and Midwest and 
(although the technology is still in its nascent economic stages) carbon 
capture and sequestration in the South.178 Without the heavy early-
stage investment by local jurisdictions in certain technologies, these 
technologies may not have developed. 
Similarly, electricity management techniques benefit from a 
decentralized grid. The division of governance authorities has allowed 
states to test out varying degrees of retail competition and rate 
structures; local communities to experiment with municipal utilities, 
cooperatives, and CCAs; and regional grid operators to try out 
different market mechanisms, such as greenhouse gas bid adders and 
wholesale-side distributed energy resources. If these techniques prove 
successful, they can be adopted by others or scaled up to the federal 
level. Again, FERC’s recent rules regarding energy storage 
participation in the wholesale markets present the perfect example: 
these rules were developed, tested out, and refined by the California 
wholesale market operator first before being scaled up for all of the 
regional wholesale markets operating under FERC’s jurisdiction.179 
4. Local Governance 
Decentralization is often celebrated for its ability to promote local 
governance. As Richard Briffault explains it, this “localism” enables 
citizens to participate in the political process, develop distinct 
communities with their own histories and values, and respond more 
effectively to matters of local concern.180 
Similarly, people have more opportunities to engage in local 
governance on a nodal grid than on a centralized one. Public utilities 
run by cities, municipalities, and communities all involve some form of 
public vote for their formation. Once created, they are managed either 
directly by consumers or indirectly via city councils or other public 
 
was responsible for more than 50% of the rooftop solar installations in the state). 
 178.  Boyd & Carlson provide a good overview of some of these, as well as other, state-based 
experiments. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 841–79. 
 179.  See supra Part II and supra note 123 and accompanying citations. 
 180.  Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 15–18 (2000); see also 
David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 377–78 (2001) 
(describing local governance as associated with the “attractive values” of “protecting localized 
decisionmaking” and “promoting responsive and participatory government by bringing the 
government closer to the people”). 
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bodies. Such entities can empower local communities to engage in self-
governance beyond simply electricity governance. 
The best example of this comes from one of the older nodes on the 
U.S. electricity grid: the TVA. This New Deal–era program was a 
massive infrastructure project intended to electrify the rural South and 
lift millions of people out of poverty through a “grassroots” approach 
to governance.181 Although the TVA originated from federal 
legislation and was supported by federal dollars, it was implemented 
primarily at the local level: hundreds of newly formed, municipally-
owned distribution plants and rural cooperatives built and then 
managed their own distribution systems in order to tap into the 
electricity supplied by federal power plants.182 Communities then 
paired this distribution with local employment, labor union 
development, and the creation of farming cooperatives and 
neighborhood libraries.183 Though the success of the TVA dwindled 
over the decades and never quite reached the lofty democratic goals 
set for it,184 the program nonetheless suggests more opportunities may 
lie for leveraging local electricity nodes to produce a wider range of 
governance outcomes. 
Self-governing utilities also allow communities to form their own 
set of values with regard to electricity governance. For instance, cities 
like Georgetown and Boulder and the CCAs in California have used 
self-governance to declare and further their environmental goals.185 
 
 181.  See Dabid Ekbladh, “Mr. TVA”: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the 
Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933-
1973, 26 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 335, 336–44 (2002) (describing the early vision of the TVA as a “grass 
roots” model of democratic governance). 
 182.  WILSON WHITMAN, DAVID LILIENTHAL: PUBLIC SERVANT IN A POWER AGE 24 
(1948). 
 183.  DAVID LILIENTHAL, THE JOURNALS OF DAVID E. LILIENTHAL VOLUME I: THE TVA 
YEARS (1939-1945), at xxix (1964) (“[B]y stimulating a far broader participation in labor unions, 
farm cooperatives, the management of relief, recovery, and security, conservation and 
development enterprises, [the TVA] enlarged the concept of democracy and the scope of its 
operation.”); see also SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 97–98 (describing the TVA’s goal of “bolster[ing] 
local cultural activities such as the construction of libraries and the development of adult 
education classes”). But see Melissa Walker, African Americans and TVA Reservoir Property 
Removal: Race in a New Deal Program, 72 AGRICULTURAL HIST. 1877 (1998) (describing how 
African American communities were neglected in and harmed by the program’s vision of white 
rural community development). 
 184.  See generally CREESE, supra note 41, at 95–124 (describing the struggle and eventual 
decline of the TVA as a source of democratic governance when the program’s emphasis shifted 
to mass electricity production for the war effort); Ekbladh, supra note 181, at 345 (“Power 
production focused on industry eventually became an end in itself rather than simply an offshoot 
of other programs, leaving some to feel the TVA had moved away from its origins.”). 
 185.  See supra Part II and notes 129–34 and accompanying citations. 
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Similarly, self-supply by corporations, college campuses, and individual 
households can encourage local governance entities to assert greater 
control over their electricity consumption, adopt solutions suitable to 
their particular concerns, and express values related to conservation, 
environmentalism, self-sufficiency, and independence. 
5. Minority Rule and Dissent 
Finally, decentralization offers opportunities for minority rule and 
what Heather Gerken terms “dissenting by deciding.”186 Decentralized 
governing units allow national minorities to become local majorities;187 
and, assuming that those governing units wield some degree of 
autonomy, those units can express their disagreement with the national 
majority by enacting policies opposed to the majority position.188 Those 
dissenting policy positions could shift the goalposts in the national 
conversation, prepare the national minority’s governing platform 
should the tides shift, or, at the very least, achieve local victories in 
contentious issues. 
A decentralized electricity grid similarly offers the chance for 
people to “dissent” from the governance of the broader electricity 
network. If a consumer disagrees over how electricity is generated, 
distributed, or sold, he or she can disconnect from the grid and supply 
his or her own electricity. A decentralized grid also allows organized 
ways to express dissent. For example, consumers’ and private 
corporations’ purchases of solar, wind, or battery resources can be 
signals of discontent with the lack of environmentally-friendly 
generation sources on the larger grid. Movements to form municipal 
utilities or CCAs can be expressions of a community’s dissatisfaction 
with how its private utility has run its electricity grid in the past. When 
President Trump pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement in 2017, 
more than fifteen states, 455 cities, 1700 businesses, and 300 institutions 
of higher learning in the U.S. affirmed their commitment to the 
Agreement’s goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by pledging to 
reduce their own carbon footprints—promises that are only possible if 
states, cities, local governments, and private entities are in charge of 
 
 186.  See generally Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005). 
 187.  Gerken, supra note 167, at 12 n.10. 
 188.  Id. at 60–61; Gerken, supra note 186, at 1759–97. 
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their own electricity procurement.189 Without the variety of 
consumption and generation nodes available on a decentralized grid, 
dissenters would not be able to turn their private or public 
disagreement into organized action that can itself influence events on 
the grid. 
B. The Policy Benefits of a Nodal Electricity Grid 
There are also policy benefits to a nodal governance approach to 
the electricity grid. Nodal governance gives policymakers and other 
actors on the grid the ability to skirt traditional centralized institutions 
in favor of sub-state entities, private actors, nonprofits, and other 
unconventional nodes to solve governance problems when formal 
institutions have stalled. This section discusses two such examples: 
California’s movement to regionalize its electricity grid, and a Green 
New Deal–style program to decarbonize the electricity grid. 
1. The Regionalization of California’s Electricity Grid 
One of the best examples of the policy benefits of a nodal 
governance approach to the electricity grid is California’s current 
debate over whether to regionalize its electricity grid. Some California 
lawmakers favor regionalization because it may reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and electricity rates for California consumers. Others are 
concerned that regionalization could disrupt California’s efforts to 
make its grid greener. A nodal governance approach to regionalization 
may help move this effort, which has been dragging for several years, 
in a new direction. 
A quick background on California’s regionalization debate: 
California has been leading the effort to reduce the carbon emissions 
from the electricity sector, passing a Renewable Portfolio Standard,190 
a carbon cap-and-trade bill,191 an energy storage mandate,192 and a 
variety of energy efficiency and distributed energy resource incentives 
intended to promote energy savings and solar and battery 
 
 189.  BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES, AMERICA’S PLEDGE: STATES, CITIES, AND 
BUSINESSES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE STEPPING UP ON CLIMATE ACTION, at 18 fig.ES-1A 
(2017). 
 190.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(a). 
 191.  See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566. 
 192.  Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to Assembly Bill 2514 
to Consider the Adoption of Procurement Targets for Viable and Cost-Effective Energy Storage 
Systems: Decision Adopting Energy Storage Procurement Framework and Design Program, 
D.13-10-040, at *2 (Oct. 3, 2013). 
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technologies.193 So far, the state has managed to support these policies 
without severe disruption to its electricity grid, primarily because 
California has an in-state-only wholesale market operator, CAISO. 
Importantly, unlike any of the other FERC-overseen wholesale market 
operators, CAISO’s governing board is composed of appointees of the 
California governor and legislature.194 Thus CAISO’s leadership has a 
strong interest in promoting California’s environmental and energy 
policies through its operation of the wholesale markets. 
But as the state approaches more aggressive renewable energy 
targets, to satisfy its electricity demands, it is finding that it increasingly 
must look outside of the state—particularly to renewable generation 
sources in the Pacific Northwest, Midwest, and Southwest, as well as to 
out-of-state consumer markets that can take up some of California’s 
excess generation during peak solar periods. As a result, some state 
officials have been pushing the California legislature to convert 
CAISO to a regional grid operator—one that would run wholesale 
electricity markets not just for California, but for the surrounding 
western states as well.195 According to a CAISO-sponsored study, 
regionalization could offer significant environmental and economic 
benefits.196 But it would come at a price: the governance board of 
 
 193.  For a summary of California’s existing policies promoting distributed energy resources 
and how the state plans to integrate them moving forward, see CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 
CALIFORNIA’S DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES ACTION PLAN: ALIGNING VISION AND 
ACTION (2016). 
 194.  The California ISO was created by California legislation and has a five-member 
oversight board, with three of those members appointed by the Governor of California, one 
member appointed by the Speaker of the California Assembly, and one member appointed by 
the Senate Committee on Rules. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 336(a)(1)–(3). 
 195.  See, e.g., Gavin Bade & Peter Maloney, California Dems Look to Restart CAISO 
Regionalization With 11th Hour Amendments, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/california-dems-look-to-restart-caiso-regionalization-with-
11th-hour-amendm/504701/; Ivan Penn, California Wants to Reinvent the Power Grid. So What 
Could Go Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/business/ 
energy-environment/california-energy-grid-jerry-brown-plan.html; Ivan Penn & Chris Megerian, 
Lawmakers Move to Add Other States to Oversight of California’s Electric Grid, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
11, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-regional-electricity-grid-20170911-story.html; 
Julia Pyper, Can California Achieve 100% Renewable Electricity by 2040? Jerry Brown Thinks So, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/squared/read/california-
100-renewables-2040-governor-brown#gs.F2ixOjM. 
 196.  Pursuant to California law, CAISO recently completed a study on the costs and benefits 
that a regional ISO would offer for the grid and the state’s environmental policies. CAL. INDEP. 
SYS. OPERATOR, SENATE BILL 350 STUDY: THE IMPACTS OF A REGIONAL ISO-OPERATED 
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CAISO would have to transition from a state-appointed body to one 
that contains representatives from all of the participating states. 
That change in leadership could create complications for 
California’s sovereignty over its environmental policies. There is the 
risk that a regional grid operator (containing representatives from less 
environmentally focused states) may not be as willing to support 
California’s environmental goals as CAISO. In fact, due to this risk, 
conversations surrounding California grid regionalization have been 
stalled for three years.197 
But that is where a nodal governance approach to the electricity 
grid could be helpful. Instead of looking to the states and the wholesale 
market operator, we might look to private nodes on the grid as sites of 
governance. After all, a regional grid is beneficial primarily because it 
would allow California customers to purchase electricity from a wider 
array of out-of-state sources, and it would allow California generators 
to sell electricity to a wider array of out-of-state customers. Why not 
empower these private nodes to purchase and sell electricity to each 
other without relying on the states or grid operator to act first? 
Such a proposal would entail CAISO designing procedures for 
individual out-of-state generators or end-users to bid into its existing 
wholesale markets, without having to bring an entire state’s electricity 
system into the fold. Merchant generators, public and private utilities, 
and even aggregated distributed energy resources could request and, 
assuming that they meet pertinent market rules and regulations, be 
granted access to CAISO’s wholesale markets. The western states 
could maintain a gatekeeping role for their own in-state utilities and 
distribution-side resources by deciding whether to permit those entities 
to bid into CAISO’s markets. Meanwhile, CAISO’s structure would 
remain the same, mitigating some regionalization opponents’ concern 
that FERC oversight would expand. 
 
 
POWER MARKET ON CALIFORNIA (2016), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/SB350Study_ 
AggregatedReport.pdf. Overall, the report estimated that California ratepayers would receive an 
annual electricity cost savings benefit ranging from $55 million a year to $1.5 billion a year from 
regionalization, depending on how many states are included and how far out the timeline is set. 
Id. at viii–ix. The study also estimated that the state would see lower greenhouse gas emissions 
for electricity serving California load under a regionalization scenario. Id. at ix–xi. Cf. Penn & 
Megerian, supra note 195 (quoting representatives from the Utility Reform Network, the Sierra 
Club, and the American Wind Energy Association California Caucus saying that regionalization 
could support out-of-state fossil fuel resources to the detriment of renewable generation). 
 197.  Jeff McDonald, Plan to Expand California Electricity Grid Powers Up for Third Time in 
as Many Years, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Feb. 23, 2018), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/sd-me-grid-regionalization-20180223-story.html. 
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In fact, such a proposal has already been adopted on a small scale 
within CAISO. In 2014, CAISO created the Western Energy 
Imbalance Market (EIM), a real-time-only regional electricity market 
that balances last-minute electricity supply and demand needs for 
CAISO and seven utilities operating in eight states and parts of 
Canada.198 The Western EIM functions much as described above, 
except on a much more limited scale.199 Nonetheless, the program has 
managed to secure cost-savings totaling around $330 million for its 
participants since the initiative started; and CAISO estimates that, in 
the first quarter of 2018 alone, approximately 28,000 metric tons of 
carbon dioxide emissions were displaced as a result of the renewable 
generation made available through the regional market.200 
If CAISO expands the Western EIM model, the market could 
approximate many of the benefits that a regional grid operator would 
bring while avoiding some of the sovereignty issues that come with a 
regional governing board. If the benefits of such integration prove 
successful, they could encourage a more formalized process for 
interjurisdictional management sanctioned by the states and the 
federal government, much as the RTO model grew out of the early 
power pools. 
2. The Green New Deal 
Moreover, a nodal governance perspective may already be making 
inroads into grid policy debates. Federal action on climate change has 
been stalled for the last several decades. But in February 2019, the 
national conversation over electricity decarbonization took a turn with 
the introduction of House Resolution 109 (the “Green New Deal”).201 
The Green New Deal—at least in its preliminary form—looks a lot like 
what one would expect from a nodal governance-style solution to 
electricity decarbonization. 
For instance, H.R. 109 calls for a “10-year national mobilization” 
to “achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions” by acting with and 
 
 198.  About, W. ENERGY IMBALANCE MKT., https://www.westerneim.com/Pages/About/ 
default.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2019). 
 199.  For instance, participants are not currently allowed to bid into CAISO’s day-ahead or 
long-term flexibility/capacity markets. 
 200.  CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, WESTERN EIM BENEFITS REPORT: FIRST QUARTER 
2018 3 (2018), https://www.westerneim.com/Documents/ISO-EIMBenefitsReportQ1_2018.pdf. 
 201.  H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong., 1st Session (Feb. 7, 2019). 
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through the decentralized governing nodes of the grid.202 The 
Resolution proposes: 
• “leveraging funding and providing investments for 
community-defined projects and strategies,”203 
• “building or upgrading to energy-efficient, distributed, and 
‘smart’ power grids,”204 
• “providing and leveraging, in a way that ensures that the 
public receives appropriate ownership stakes and returns on 
investment, adequate capital (including through community 
grants, public banks, and other public financing), technical 
expertise, supporting policies, and other forms of assistance 
to communities, organizations, Federal, State, and local 
government agencies, and businesses working on the Green 
New Deal mobilization,”205 
• “directing investments to spur economic development, 
deepen and diversify industry and business in local and 
regional economies, and build wealth and community 
ownership,”206 and 
• “ensuring the use of democratic and participatory processes 
that are inclusive of and led by frontline and vulnerable 
communities and workers to plan, implement, and administer 
the Green New Deal mobilization at the local level.”207 
In other words, the Resolution calls for funding from the federal 
government, but locates decision-making within a variety of state, sub-
state, local, private, and nonprofit actors.208 In particular, the 
Resolution favors local nodes run by poor and minority communities. 
Those nodes appear to have significant flexibility to select the 
means by which they wish to achieve their goals. The Resolution sets 
the broad goal of “meeting 100 percent of the power demand in the 
U.S. through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources.”209 
 
 202.  Id. at 5–6. 
 203.  Id. at 7. 
 204.  Id. at 8. 
 205.  Id. at 11. 
 206.  Id. at 12. 
 207.  Id. at 12. 
 208.  See David Roberts, There’s Now an Official Green New Deal. Here’s What’s in It., VOX 
(Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/2/7/18211709/green-new-deal 
-resolution-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-markey (“[S]omething like two-thirds of the [Green New 
Deal] requirements, depending on how you count, direct political power and public investment 
down to the state, local, and worker level . . . .”). 
 209.  H.R. Res. 109, at 7. 
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It does not mandate that this goal be achieved through solely a 
command-and-control or neoliberal marketplace model—as would be 
the case if, say, the plan called for a carbon tax or issued a nationwide 
ban on coal plants. Instead, the Resolution sets a loose standard that 
invites nodes to select their preferred methodology. By characterizing 
the energy sources as “clean, renewable, and zero-emission,” the 
Resolution leaves a whole menu of generation options open—ranging 
from nuclear to hydroelectric to (theoretically) zero-emission coal with 
carbon capture and sequestration technology. This framework suggests 
that the agenda for decarbonization will be set community by 
community, node by node. 
Of course, the Resolution is still a draft, and a sparse one at that. 
But the plan appears to recognize that solving a problem like climate 
change—or, in this narrow context, decarbonization of the electricity 
grid—is as much a governance problem as anything else. Leveraging 
the benefits of our nodal grid—particularly its opportunities for policy 
experimentation and local governance—to achieve larger policy goals 
could be a step in the right direction. 
IV. THREATS TO THE NODAL GRID 
The benefits outlined above suggest that a nodal governance 
approach to the electricity grid could provide a fruitful model for the 
grid’s pressing problems. But such an approach has been threatened by 
recent developments in electricity law jurisprudence. Over the last few 
years, the U.S. Supreme Court and FERC have been interpreting the 
Federal Power Act in a manner that elevates the wholesale markets 
above any other governing node on the grid. This interpretation breaks 
from both the structure of the Federal Power Act—which itself reflects 
the nodal and interconnected nature of the electricity grid—and the 
approach that the Supreme Court has taken to FERC’s governing 
authority in the past, which has typically respected the importance of 
cooperation and balance between governing nodes. This interpretive 
change could lead to a concentration of power within FERC and, 
concomitantly, a decrease in the power of other nodes. 
A. The Federal Power Act and the Nodal Grid 
First, a quick overview of the Federal Power Act. The Act divides 
regulatory authority between the states, the federal government, and 
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public and private utilities—consistent with the nodal governance 
approach described above. In fact, the Act specifically carves out space 
for cooperative and voluntary relationships between a diversity of grid 
entities. And it repeatedly emphasizes the need for collaboration 
rather than unilateral, top-down decision-making. 
For instance, the Act declares that it is public policy that FERC 
shall have regulatory authority over “the transmission of electric 
energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at 
wholesale,” and that FERC’s powers extend “only to those matters 
which are not subject to regulation by the States.”210 Thus, FERC is 
given jurisdiction over transmission, wholesale sales of electricity, and 
facilities that engage in either.211 The states maintain jurisdiction over 
“any other sale of electric energy” (including, most prominently, retail 
sales), as well as facilities used for generation, local distribution, 
intrastate transmission, and self-supply.212 From the outset, then, the 
Act recognizes that both FERC and the states play vital governing 
roles on the grid (with, arguably, FERC’s powers constrained by those 
exercised by the states). 
The Act also acknowledges the governing presence of public and 
private utilities. The Act excludes from its regulations all utilities 
owned by “the United States, a State or any political subdivision of a 
State, [or] an electric cooperative.”213 These entities remain free to self-
regulate without FERC’s interference. And the Act reserves a role for 
private utilities as well. For instance, although FERC is charged with 
ensuring that the wholesale rates set by utilities are “just and 
reasonable,”214 private utilities remain free to negotiate bilateral 
contracts setting those rates for themselves.215 FERC also must 
consider reliability standards “used by, or suggested for use by, the 
electric utility industry.”216 The Act leaves it up to the private utilities 
to create the “voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities 
for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy.”217 
The Act also repeatedly emphasizes the need for consultation and 
cooperation between governing nodes. For instance, before 
 
 210.  16 U.S.C. § 824(a). 
 211.  Id. § 824(b)(1). 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. § 824(f). 
 214.  Id. § 824d(a). 
 215.  Id. § 824d(c), (d). 
 216.  Id. § 824a-2(a)(2)(F). 
 217.  Id. § 824a(a). 
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segmenting the country into regional districts for grid interconnection, 
FERC must “give notice to the State commission of each State situated 
wholly or in part within such district, and shall afford each such State 
commission reasonable opportunity to present its views and 
recommendations, and shall receive and consider such views and 
recommendations.”218 Before directing any utility to connect its 
transmission lines to other utilities, FERC must give notice to the state 
PUC and the utility, provide opportunity for a hearing, and establish 
that “no undue burden will be placed” on the utility.219 FERC is 
prohibited from compelling utilities to open up their transmission lines 
if that would “impair [the utility’s] ability to render adequate services 
to its customers.”220 FERC may only prescribe rules encouraging the 
adoption of cogeneration and other small, non-fossil-fuel generators 
after “consultation with representatives of Federal and State 
regulatory agencies” and after “public notice and a reasonable 
opportunity for interested persons (including State and Federal 
agencies) to submit oral as well as written data, views, and 
arguments.”221 And FERC has the general power to “refer any matter 
arising in the administration of” the FPA to a board of relevant State 
representatives, who are “vested with the same power” as FERC.222 
Altogether, these provisions recognize an overlapping, multi-
nodal electricity grid built on cooperation and communication. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Historic Respect for Nodal Governance 
The Supreme Court has historically been respectful of the Act’s 
nodal structure, while still allowing FERC wide discretion in how it 
undertakes its statutory responsibilities. 
For instance, in Connecticut Power & Light v. Federal Power 
Commission, one of the Court’s earliest cases addressing jurisdiction 
under the Federal Power Act, the Court explained that “the fact that a 
local commission may also have regulatory power [over an electricity 
facility] does not preclude exercise of the Commission’s functions.”223 
 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. § 824a(b). 
 221.  Id. § 824a-3(a)(2). 
 222.  Id. § 824h(a). 
 223.  Conn. Power & Light v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 533 (1945). 
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The Court cited approvingly to the congressional record, which 
explained that the Act was “designed to secure coordination on a 
regional scale of the Nation’s power resources” and “conceived 
entirely as a supplement to, and not as a substitution for State 
regulation.”224 And Congress intended for the Act to “reconcile the 
claims of federal and of local authorities and to apportion federal and 
state jurisdiction over the industry”225—an intent that the Court must 
take into account.226 
In the years that followed, the Supreme Court upheld regulatory 
schemes that required the involvement of multiple different governing 
nodes. It held that private companies’ bilaterally negotiated wholesale 
rates carry a presumption of lawfulness subject to FERC’s ultimate 
oversight.227 It allowed state PUCs, alongside the federal Rural 
Electrification Administration, to regulate rural cooperatives as a 
matter of “legitimate local public interest[].”228 It affirmed state PUCs’ 
ability to set retail rates but required them to incorporate FERC-
approved wholesale rates in their cost calculations in order to give full 
force to both parties’ rate-setting responsibilities.229 It upheld FERC’s 
ability to implement an “open-access” transmission policy—allowing a 
new bevy of nodes to gain access to the grid—while permitting the 
 
 224.  Id. at 525 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 5423, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 384). 
 225.  Id. at 531. 
 226.  According to the Court: “Congress is acutely aware of the existence and vitality of these 
state governments. It sometimes is moved to respect state rights and local institutions even when 
some degree of efficiency of a federal plan is thereby sacrificed. Congress may think it expedient 
to avoid clashes between state and federal officials in administering an act such as we have here. 
Conflicts which lead state officials to stand shoulder to shoulder with private corporations making 
common cause of resistance to federal authority may be thought to be prejudicial to the ends 
sought by an act and regulation more likely to be successful, even though more limited, if it has 
local support. Congress may think complete centralization of control of the electric industry likely 
to overtax administrative capacity of a federal commission. It may, too, think it wise to keep the 
hand of state regulatory bodies in this business, for the ‘insulated chambers of the states’ are still 
laboratories where many lessons in regulation may be learned by trial and error on a small scale 
without involving a whole national industry in every experiment.” Id. at 530. 
 227.  This is known as the “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” and was developed in two cases issued in 
the same term: United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and 
FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956). See also Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. 
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 530–34 (2008) (explaining and reaffirming the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine). 
 228.  Ark. Elec. Coop. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 394 (1983) (quoting 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 499 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)). 
 229.  Entergy La. Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 49–50 (2003); Miss. Power & 
Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 371–73 (1988); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 
476 U.S. 953, 970 (1986). 
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states to maintain jurisdiction over retail-side transmission.230 The 
Court also repeatedly explained that FERC, “within the limitations 
imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands,” must 
“devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse 
and conflicting interests.”231 
C. The Court’s Recent Disruption of Nodal Governance in EPSA and 
Hughes 
In the last few years, however, the Supreme Court has taken a new 
approach to the Federal Power Act that threatens to upend the existing 
nodal grid. This shift stems from two cases decided in 2016: Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n 
(EPSA)232 and Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC (Hughes).233 
In EPSA, the Court was faced with how to define FERC’s jurisdiction 
on a nodal grid that is increasingly intertwined. In Hughes, the Court 
confronted the same question with regard to the states. Instead of 
adopting the same approach to both cases, however, the Court took a 
functional and permissive attitude to FERC’s governing authority, 
while simultaneously cabining states’ governing power within 
formalistic constraints. 
1. FERC v. EPSA 
In EPSA, the Court addressed whether FERC had jurisdiction 
under the Federal Power Act to regulate demand response bids made 
in the wholesale marketplace.234 The case presented a thorny 
jurisdictional issue. On the one hand, wholesale demand response bids 
(i.e., bids submitted into the wholesale markets by consumers to reduce 
their electricity consumption) consist of wholesale market transactions. 
These transactions would typically fall under FERC’s jurisdiction. On 
 
 230.  New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 7–11, 16–17, 25–26 (2002). 
 231.  Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968). See also Morgan Stanley 
Capital Grp. Inc., 554 U.S. at 532 (“We have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission is not 
bound to any one ratemaking formula . . . . But FERC must choose a method that entails an 
appropriate ‘balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.’” (quoting FPC v. Hope Nat. 
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)). 
 232.  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 
(2016). 
 233.  Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). 
 234.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767. 
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the other hand, the bids involved consumers promising to reduce their 
retail consumption for a price set by FERC, which would ordinarily fall 
to the states to regulate. 
The Court chose to resolve this issue by taking a functional 
approach to FERC’s regulatory authority. First, according to the 
Court, the Act gives FERC jurisdiction over wholesale rates, including 
“rules or practices that ‘directly affect the [wholesale] rate.’”235 
Demand response bids directly affect the wholesale rate because they 
influence the wholesale supply and demand curves.236 Thus, FERC has 
jurisdiction over demand response bids.237 
Second, the Court held that FERC’s regulation of demand 
response does not intrude on the states’ retail jurisdiction because the 
purpose of FERC’s demand response regulations is to “improv[e] the 
wholesale market.”238 The Court explained that “[t]he retail market 
figures no more in the Rule’s goals than in the mechanism through 
which the Rule operates.”239 Because the Court adopted a functional 
approach to the FPA, the end goal of the regulation, not the means, 
was what mattered. Even though FERC was setting the rate at which 
retail actors received compensation for their non-consumption, it was 
not regulating retail rates.240 
In fact, the Court went even further. The Court held that, not only 
did it not matter that FERC’s regulation operated through the retail 
markets, but also it was entirely irrelevant that the demand response 
bids had retail-side effects.241 According to the Court, “[w]hen FERC 
regulates what takes place on the wholesale market, as part of carrying 
out its charge to improve how that market runs, then no matter the 
effect on retail rates, [the FPA] imposes no bar.”242 FERC need not 
even consider the impact of its regulation on retail rates because “[t]hat 
is of no legal consequence.”243 
 
 235.  Id. at 774 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 
F.3d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
 236.  Id. at 774. 
 237.  Id. at 774–75. 
 238.  Id. at 776. 
 239.  Id. at 777. 
 240.  Id. at 776 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 
(2015)). 
 241. Id. at 776. 
 242.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 243.  Id. 
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2. Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC 
In Hughes, the Court addressed whether Maryland could 
subsidize an in-state generation facility by (1) directing in-state utilities 
to enter into long-term contracts with the facility, (2) requiring the 
facility to bid its capacity244 into one of FERC’s wholesale capacity 
markets, and (3) making the utilities pay the facility at a rate contingent 
upon the price that the facility received in the wholesale market.245 
Again, Hughes presented a jurisdictional puzzle: under the FPA, states 
have jurisdiction over generation facilities. But FERC retains 
jurisdiction over the wholesale rates that generators receive for their 
electricity sales. The problem was how to draw the jurisdictional line 
on an electricity grid where generation facilities and wholesale markets 
overlap. 
Given its approach in EPSA, one might expect that the Court 
would take the same functional approach to resolve Hughes, looking 
to the target and purpose of the state program to determine whether it 
was lawful. Not so. First, the Court acknowledged that Maryland’s 
“traditional authority” gave it jurisdiction over “in-state generation.”246 
And the purpose of the Maryland program—”attempting to encourage 
construction of new in-state generation”—was “legitimate.”247 But it 
concluded that the “means” by which Maryland sought to accomplish 
that goal was unlawful.248 Specifically, the Court held that because 
Maryland required the generation facility to bid into the capacity 
market, then had in-state utilities pay the facility “a rate distinct from 
the clearing price” set by the market, Maryland “invade[d] FERC’s 
regulatory turf”249—even though, like the demand response rules at 
issue in EPSA, the wholesale market acted as no more than the 
mechanism through which the Maryland program operated. 
Understanding the formalistic distinctions made in Hughes 
requires some discussion of the nuances of electricity capacity markets. 
Capacity markets are markets for the total amount of long-term 
 
 244.  Capacity indicates the total amount of electricity a generator is able to sell over the long 
term, rather than split-second generation. 
 245.  Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292, 1294–96 (2016). 
 246.  Id. at 1299. 
 247.  Id. at 1298. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. 
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available generation in a region. They work as follows: wholesale 
market operators calculate future demand projections, often several 
years in advance, for the entire region. They then divvy up that demand 
between all of the distribution utilities in the region. Each utility must 
purchase an amount of capacity proportional to its share of future 
customer demand. At the same time, generators in the region submit 
bids for their expected future supply. The utilities buy their requisite 
capacity from these bids. The price (rate) for capacity is set by the 
market.250 
Now, utilities may also satisfy their capacity requirements by 
purchasing electricity directly from generators through a bilateral 
contract. In those contracts, the parties buy long-term electricity supply 
and set the rates themselves. In order to account for the capacity 
covered by these contracts, utilities are required to bid any bilateral 
contracts they hold into the capacity marketplace. Usually, utilities bid 
those contracts in at some nominal price ($0) to ensure that they clear 
the market, as the utilities have already purchased the capacity. The 
utilities then, outside of the FERC-run market, pay the generators the 
rate agreed to in the bilateral contract.251 Notably, states will often 
mandate that their in-state utilities enter into bilateral contracts in 
order to encourage investment in certain forms of generation. (Many 
state renewable energy policies, for instance, operate in this manner.) 
From this explanation, it should be clear that the Maryland 
program at issue in Hughes functioned much the same as a bilateral 
contract. But FERC has “long accommodated” bilateral contracts in 
its markets—a practice that the Hughes Court endorsed.252 So what 
made the programs different? According to the Court, Maryland’s 
program required the generation facility to submit its capacity into the 
marketplace, whereas for bilateral contracts, it was the utility that did 
so.253 The Maryland program “operate[d] within the auction” in a 
manner that interfered with FERC’s jurisdiction.254 But both the 
Maryland program and the bilateral contracts had the exact same effect 
on the wholesale market rate. The Court was thus primarily concerned 
with the precise formal entity that bid the contracts into the wholesale 
capacity market, rather than the effect that the contracts had on 
market-based capacity prices. This stands in stark contrast to the 
 
 250.  Id. at 1293. 
 251.  Id. at 1293–94. 
 252.  Id. at 1299. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id. 
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Court’s approach in EPSA, where it disregarded formalistic 
distinctions so long as the purpose of the program was FERC-related. 
We are left, then, with an EPSA-based approach to FERC 
jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act where FERC has free rein to 
regulate, without regard to the effect of its policies on other parts of 
the market, so long as it targets rules and practices that “directly affect” 
the wholesale markets. Meanwhile, states must take a Hughes-based 
approach and be especially wary of the precise ways in which their 
regulations intersect with the wholesale markets. FERC’s governing 
power is thus elevated above that of the states in a manner inconsistent 
with the structure and language of the Federal Power Act and the 
Court’s historical approach to electricity grid jurisprudence. By 
employing two different approaches with regard to FERC and the 
states, irrespective of which approach is “better,” the Court has created 
an uneven playing field. 
D. The Consequences of the Court’s Uneven Approach in EPSA and 
Hughes 
The Court’s uneven approach to different governing nodes on the 
grid threatens to upend its existing nodal state, consolidating power 
within FERC while others are diminished. For instance, state programs 
are currently under attack in the courts for potential Hughes violations, 
while FERC is using its EPSA-backed control over the wholesale 
markets to either diminish the power of state programs or kick them 
out of the markets entirely. The end result could be a less innovative 
grid that loses the benefits of decentralization. 
Soon after Hughes came down, several state programs supporting 
in-state generation came under attack. For instance, Connecticut’s 
renewable energy procurement program (intended to encourage the 
construction of renewable generators in Connecticut) was challenged 
under a theory of Hughes-style preemption. The Second Circuit 
ultimately upheld the program, but only after a careful formalistic 
distinction between the Maryland program in Hughes and the 
Connecticut program.255 New York’s and Illinois’ subsidies for nuclear 
generators also faced litigation. Although in both cases the Courts of 
Appeals upheld the programs under a similarly formalistic approach, 
 
 255.  Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d. 82, 97–100 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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petitions for certiorari for both of those decisions are pending before 
the Supreme Court.256 And Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act 
was struck down by the Eighth Circuit, in part because of concerns that 
the program regulated capacity market prices in violation of Hughes.257 
Meanwhile, FERC has been using its control over wholesale 
markets to undermine state-based programs in a change from its past 
practice. This phenomenon can be seen most clearly in the wholesale 
capacity markets. In the past, FERC employed a “price floor” in the 
capacity markets in order to prevent market participants from 
manipulating capacity prices by artificially lowering them. These price 
floors often had the unintended effect of shutting out bilateral 
contracts and state-mandated procurement from the capacity markets 
because, as discussed above, those contracts are often bid in at $0. In 
order to counteract that effect, in the years prior to Hughes and EPSA, 
FERC accommodated out-of-market contracts by selectively 
exempting them from the price floor.258 
But in the past year, FERC has indicated that it is no longer willing 
to accommodate out-of-market contracts, particularly those mandated 
by state programs. In an order issued in March 2018, FERC expressed 
concern that out-of-market contracts “raise[] a potential conflict with 
the Commission’s interest in maintaining efficient and competitive 
wholesale electric markets.”259 To combat this, a minority of FERC 
commissioners suggested that the price floor may be used to preempt 
such programs from the capacity markets entirely.260 Three months 
later, FERC officially abandoned its policy of accommodation, 
declaring that “the integrity and effectiveness of the capacity market” 
have become “untenably threatened” by these out-of-market 
contracts, and that wholesale market operators must apply the price 
floor to all generation forms with “few to no exemptions.”261 
 
 256.  See Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Ziebelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018), Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, No. 18-879; Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018), 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, No. 18-868. 
 257.  North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 927 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 258.  For a good explanation of this practice, see Miles Farmer & Bruce Ho, Federal Power 
Rules Threaten New England Renewable Energy, NRDC EXPERT BLOG (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/bruce-ho/federal-power-rules-threaten-new-england-renewable-
energy. 
 259.  ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at *6 (2018). 
 260.  Id. Commissioners LaFleur, id. at *37, Powelson, id. at *38–40, and Glick, id. at *42, 
indicated that they did not agree with this preemption policy, suggesting that the position received 
support from only two out of five Commissioners. 
 261.  Order Rejecting Proposed Tariff Revisions, Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
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FERC’s new stance towards out-of-market contracts leaves states 
in an unenviable position. They can forego their generation programs 
entirely, essentially ceding control over generation facilities to FERC’s 
wholesale markets. Or they can require their utilities to purchase 
capacity in FERC’s markets and buy state-mandated capacity 
consistent with state renewable energy and other programs. But that 
would force consumers to double-pay for capacity, once for the FERC 
market and once for the state program. Or states could pull their 
utilities out of the wholesale markets entirely and opt for a form of 
state-owned generation and distribution—essentially, a government-
run electricity industry. In other words, FERC, in its most recent 
orders, is telling states that they can either acquiesce to FERC’s 
demands or leave the wholesale markets. 
Following both of these strands of electricity law phenomena—the 
attack on state programs in the courts and in the FERC-run capacity 
markets—to their logical ends leads to some troubling outcomes for 
the electricity grid. As discussed in Parts II and III, the decentralized 
electricity grid offers significant governance benefits. States can be the 
sites of experimentation in grid technologies and management 
techniques as well as local governance. States, in partnership with 
direct and indirect self-governance nodes, have helped spur innovation 
in solar, wind, energy storage, and distributed energy resources, in 
some cases even supporting these resources until they could be scaled 
up and competitive in the wholesale markets. The wholesale markets, 
in turn, encourage cost-competitiveness and efficiency, allowing local 
generation to access regional markets and larger customer bases. If 
states abandon some of their more innovative programs due to threats 
from FERC, or if the wholesale markets diminish in their reach due to 
state withdrawal, these benefits of multi-nodal governance would be 
lost. 
The damage would be based upon an erroneous approach to 
electricity grid governance as embodied in the Federal Power Act and 
historical practice. As FERC Commissioner Richard Glick noted in his 
dissent from the Commission’s June 2018 order: 
It is an inevitable consequence of the FPA’s division of jurisdiction 
over the electricity sector that one sovereign’s exercise of its 
 
Complaint, and Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, 163 FERC 
¶ 61,236, at *2–3 (2018). 
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authority will affect matters subject to the other sovereign’s 
exclusive jurisdiction. . . . But the existence of such cross-
jurisdictional effects is not necessarily a ‘problem’ for the purposes 
of the FPA. Rather, these cross-jurisdictional effects are the product 
of the ‘congressionally designed interplay between state and federal 
regulation’ . . . .262 
Mistaking the complexities and interconnections of the electricity 
grid for failures of grid governance, as FERC has done in its approach 
the capacity markets and as the Supreme Court did in Hughes, is 
misguided. And concentrating power within FERC, to the detriment 
of other governing nodes, in order to correct this so-called problem 
threatens to upend the nodal governance model of the grid. This could 
result in a grid that is less innovative, less adaptable to new 
technologies, less responsive to regional changes and local concerns. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The threat of consolidation of power within FERC at the expense 
of other governing nodes on the grid is poised to get worse, not better. 
As we saw in EPSA, the Court was very willing to give FERC 
jurisdiction over new grid programs that intersect with the wholesale 
markets. Demand response represents only the tip of the iceberg. 
FERC may soon assert control over residential solar panels, electric 
vehicles, and even residential smart thermostats. While we may want 
to incorporate these devices into the wholesale markets, we may also 
want to subject them to governance control at a state and local level as 
well. Courts, policymakers, and regulators must recognize that the U.S. 
electricity grid operates according to a nodal governance framework, 
not a centralized, top-down system. Giving other nodes the ability to 
exercise governing power alongside FERC allows the grid to innovate, 
experiment, and adapt to the changing needs and preferences of 
consumers, and better prepares the grid for the many challenges it 
faces now and in the years to come. 
 
 
 262.  Id. at *50 (Glick, Commissioner, dissenting). 
